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Article 1

ARTICLES

Deliberating the Divine
ON EXTENDING THE JUSTIFICATION FROM TRUTH
TO RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION
John M. Kang†
The justification from truth represents the most
prominent basis of legal support for the right of free speech.1
President Lee Bollinger at Columbia University, a First
Amendment scholar and a former law school dean at the
University of Michigan, has stated that the search for truth is

†
Assistant Professor of Law, St. Thomas University, Miami (jkang@stu.edu).
B.A., University of California, Berkeley; J.D., University of California, Los Angeles;
M.A., Ph.D., University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. I would like to thank the following
people who have either read the manuscript or discussed some of the ideas therein with
me, although none should be understood as necessarily endorsing anything in the
Article: Monsignor Andy Anderson, Steve Clark, Lauren Gilbert, Dan Gordon, Brad
Joondeph, Jeremy Paul, and Kim Smith. Amanda Bell and Damaris Rosich-Schwartz
provided research assistance. Lynn Bridgers, Don Herzog, and Lenora Ledwon helped
me with secondary sources, and Scott E. Page kindly gave me access to the galley
proofs for his then forthcoming book on diversity and deliberation. I presented a
version of this Article at the 2006 meeting of the Association for the Study of Law,
Culture and Humanities at Syracuse University. This Article is for Jung Won Kwak,
with whom I have argued many times about truth, religious and otherwise.
1
See William P. Marshall, In Defense of the Search for Truth as a First
Amendment Justification, 30 GA. L. REV. 1, 1 (1995) (“The most influential argument
supporting the constitutional commitment to freedom of speech is the contention that
speech is valuable because it leads to the discovery of truth.”). The First Amendment
scholar Frederick Schauer has also commented: “Throughout the ages many diverse
arguments have been employed to attempt to justify a principle of freedom of speech.
Of all these, the predominant and most persevering has been the argument that free
speech is particularly valuable because it leads to the discovery of truth.” FREDERICK
SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 15 (1982). C. Edwin Baker also
writes: “Marketplace notions are not the only strains to be heard in the chorus of Court
pronouncements on the first amendment. . . . Nevertheless, the marketplace theory
dominates; and its rejection would have major implications for first amendment
interpretation.” C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment: Freedom of Speech, 25
UCLA L. REV. 964, 973-74 (1978); see also infra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
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the “dominant value” of free speech in our contemporary
democracy.2 He explains:
In today’s discourse about free speech, the dominant value
associated with speech is its role in getting at the truth, or the
advancement of knowledge. Speech is the means by which people
convey information and ideas, by which they communicate
viewpoints and propositions and hypotheses, which can then be
tested against the speech of others. Through the process of open
discussion we find out what we ourselves think and are then able to
compare that with what others think on the same issues. The end
result of this process, we hope, is that we will arrive at as close an
approximation of the truth as we can.3

In the passage, the justification from truth appears to be
underwritten by a degree of agnosticism or a temporary
suspension of belief regarding normative matters, that is, ideas

2
3

LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY 45 (1986).
Id. Thomas Emerson explains:

[F]reedom of expression is an essential process for advancing knowledge and
discovering truth. An individual who seeks knowledge and truth must hear
all sides of the question, consider all alternatives, test his judgment by
exposing it to opposition, and make full use of different minds. Discussion
must be kept open no matter how certainly true an accepted opinion may
seem to be; many of the most widely acknowledged truths have turned out to
be erroneous. Conversely, the same principle applies no matter how false or
pernicious the new opinion appears to be; for the unaccepted opinion may be
true or partially true and, even if wholly false, its presentation and open
discussion compel a rethinking and retesting of the accepted opinion.
THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6-7 (1970); see also
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 785-86 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing
the potential for speech to contribute to truth).
Of course, the justification from truth is not without its critics. Stanley
Ingber remains skeptical about the basic assumptions inherent in the justification from
truth. Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J.
1, 1. His criticisms deserve the kind of careful replies that would take me outside the
scope of this Article, although I do address some of the objections. C. Edwin Baker also
writes that the “hope that the marketplace leads to truth, or even to the best or most
desirable decision, becomes implausible” given that, among other things, the economic
and social resources necessary to spread one’s ideas are not distributed equally in
society. Baker, supra note 1, at 974, 978. For more criticisms of the justification from
truth, see C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 12-17 (1989); see
also infra notes 112-125 and accompanying text.
For the moment, however, perhaps it will suffice to say that the
justification from truth is the dominant view in the Supreme Court with regard to the
right of free speech. Even critics of the justification from truth feel compelled to
acknowledge this fact. Professor Baker thus declares that the “marketplace of ideas
theory consistently dominates the Supreme Court’s discussions of freedom of speech.”
BAKER, supra note 1, at 7 (footnote omitted). In this Article, I work from the premise
that the search for truth is the dominant justification for the right of free speech in the
Supreme Court, and I examine the ways in which it can be applied to religious
expression.
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about what is right and wrong.4 The right of free speech under
this justification is not logically tied to any particular
substantive outcome of public discourse. The right is, as a
formal matter, only committed to a process whereby we
“communicate viewpoints and propositions and hypotheses,
which can then be tested against the speech of others.”5 Under
this justification from truth, we value the right of free speech
not principally for the speaker’s sake but for that of the
audience. For it is the audience that wishes to be exposed to
viewpoints and ideas about which they can deliberate.6
The justification from truth possesses a majestic and
rich history in both Western political theory as well as federal
Supreme Court cases, and it has enlisted the considerable
powers of figures like John Stuart Mill and Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr.7 So attractive has been the justification that it has
been conscripted by judges in the areas of political speech,8
commercial speech,9 and even pornography.10 Curiously,
4

Similarly, Bollinger has suggested that the toleration demanded of us by
the First Amendment requires “a willingness to compromise and a willingness even to
accept total defeat. . . . Democracy, like literature, it may be said, requires a kind of
suspension of disbelief.” BOLLINGER, supra note 2, at 117. Frederick Schauer has also
stressed the fallibilism of the justification of truth by clarifying that the justification
seeks “knowledge,” which can be provisional as opposed to “certainty” which cannot.
SCHAUER, supra note 1, at 16, 18.
5
BOLLINGER, supra note 2. Robert Post offers a similar treatment of public
discourse and the First Amendment. ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS:
DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT 277-78 (1995). Frederick Schauer also argues
that according to the argument from truth, “[o]pen discussion, free exchange of ideas,
freedom of enquiry, and freedom to criticize . . . are necessary conditions for the
effective functioning of the process of searching for truth.” SCHAUER, supra note 1, at
15.
6
Perhaps the most well known presentation of this view in the legal
literature comes from Alexander Meiklejohn’s justification for free speech in a
democracy. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELFGOVERNMENT 24-27 (Kennikat Press 1972) (1948); see also OWEN FISS, THE IRONY OF
FREE SPEECH 2-3 (1996); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE
SPEECH 18-20 (1993).
7
See infra Part I.
8
See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring) (urging a judicial attitude toward political speech that has faith in “the
power of reason as applied through public discussion”), overruled in part by
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444; Gitlow v. New York 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925)
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (advocating that competing political perspectives “should be
given their chance and have their way”); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630
(1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (defending political speech on the view that “the best
test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market”).
9
See Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Twp. of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 95 (1977)
(rejecting a prohibition on commercial speech that tries to achieve “its goal by
restricting the free flow of truthful information”); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va.
Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976) (justifying commercial speech on
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however, it has made relatively little ingress into the area of
religious expression, as the subject of either the Court’s
jurisprudence11 or the scholarly literature.12 I believe that the
the premise that “people will perceive their own best interests if only they are well
enough informed, and that the best means to that end is to open the channels of
communication rather than to close them”).
10
See Am. Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 331 (7th Cir. 1985)
(arguing that the government should permit a diversity of viewpoints about
pornography and that “the government may not restrict speech on the ground that in a
free exchange truth is not yet dominant”).
11
The Court has offered a glimmer of what an extension of the justification
from truth to religious expression might look like. Justice Roberts for the Court in
Cantwell v. Connecticut provided just two sentences:
To persuade others to his own point of view, the pleader, as we know, at
times, resorts to exaggeration, to vilification of men who have been, or are,
prominent in church or state, and even to false statement. But the people of
this nation have ordained in the light of history, that, in spite of the
probability of excesses and abuses, these liberties are, in the long view,
essential to enlightened opinion and right conduct on the part of the citizens
of a democracy.
310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940). So, too, Justice Black wrote only brief remarks alluding to the
justification from truth in his majority opinion in Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501
(1946), in which he rejected a company town’s efforts to preclude Jehovah’s Witnesses
from entering the town and distributing leaflets to the company workers: “To act as
good citizens they must be informed. In order to enable them to be properly informed
their information must be uncensored.” Id. at 508. For further discussion of Marsh, see
infra notes 286-294 and accompanying text.
The Supreme Court has traditionally framed the right of religious
expression in terms of whether a government statute violates a person’s right to
religious conscience or belief. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 597 (1992) (rejecting a
state-sanctioned religious exercise “in which the student was left with no alternative
but to submit”); Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
877 (1990) (“The free exercise of religion means, first and foremost, the right to believe
and profess whatever religious doctrine one desires.”), superseded by statute, Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488; Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52-53 (1985) (The “[c]ourt has unambiguously concluded that the
individual freedom of conscience protected by the First Amendment embraces the right
to select any religious faith or none at all.”); Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind.
Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 717-18 (1981) (“Where the state conditions receipt
of an important benefit upon conduct proscribed by a religious faith, or where it denies
such a benefit because of conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby putting
substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs, a
burden upon religion exists.”); Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 15-16
(1947) (arguing that neither the state nor the federal government “can pass laws which
aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another”); United States v.
Ballard 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944) (citation omitted) (“Freedom of thought, which includes
freedom of religious belief, is basic in a society of free men. It embraces the right to
maintain theories of life and of death and of the hereafter which are rank heresy to
followers of the orthodox faiths.”); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
642 (1943) (“If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in . . . religion, or other
matters of opinion . . . .”); Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303 (“Freedom of conscience and
freedom to adhere to such religious organization or form of worship as the individual
may choose cannot be restricted by law.”); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 728 (1871) (“In
this country the full and free right to entertain any religious belief, to practice any
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religious principle, and to teach any religious doctrine which does not violate the laws
of morality and property, and which does not infringe personal rights, is conceded to
all.”).
Law professors have also commented on the view that the Supreme Court’s
religion clauses are used to protect the right of religious belief and conscience.
Laurence Tribe explains:
Allocating religious choices to the unfettered consciences of individuals under
the free exercise clause remains, in part, a means of assuring that church and
state do not unite to create the many dangers and divisions often implicit in
such an established union. Similarly, forbidding the excessive identification
of church and state through the establishment clause remains, in part, a
means of assuring that government does not excessively intrude upon
religious liberty. Thus the Supreme Court has frequently recognized that “the
two clauses may overlap.”
TRIBE, supra note 3, at 1156-57 (quoting Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
222 (1963)); see also DAVID A. J. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 12833, 141-49 (1986) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the religion
clauses reflect a Western tradition of protecting the right to conscience); Arlin M.
Adams & Charles J. Emmerich, A Heritage of Religious Liberty, 137 U. PA. L. REV.
1559, 1643 (1989) (“The core value of the religion clauses is liberty of conscience in
religious matters, an ideal which recurs throughout American history from the colonial
period of Roger Williams to the early national period of the Founders.”); Noah
Feldman, From Liberty to Equality: The Transformation of the Establishment Clause,
90 CAL. L. REV. 673, 676-77 (2002) (“For the Framers, the [Establishment] Clause was
understood to protect religious conscience, and so the answer was straightforward:
religion deserved special protection from alliance with government because, more than
other forms of action or belief, religion required free choice to be meaningful.” (footnote
omitted)); Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77
N.Y.U. L. REV. 346, 398 (2002) (“In the time between the proposal of the Constitution
and of the Bill of Rights, the predominant, not to say exclusive, argument against
established churches was that they had the potential to violate liberty of conscience.”);
Kent Greenawalt, Common Sense About Original and Subsequent Understandings of
the Religion Clauses, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 479, 492 (2006) (“Whatever may be true
about the Establishment Clause, the Free Exercise Clause seemed a natural way to
protect liberty of religious conscience.”); Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and
Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1480-99,
1511-13 (1990) (arguing that the original understanding of the free exercise clause was
based exclusively on the right of religionists to be faithful to their consciences); Jay
Alan Sekulow, James Matthew Henderson, Sr., & Kevin E. Broyles, Religious Freedom
and the First Self-Evident Truth: Equality as a Guiding Principle in Interpreting the
Religion Clauses, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 351, 387 (1995) (“Under the equality
understanding, the Establishment Clause protects every citizen’s right to make
voluntary choices regarding religion by forbidding the government from using its power
to join the marketplace of ideas on the side of any belief, regardless of whether it favors
or disfavors religion.”); Rodney K. Smith & Patrick A. Shea, Religion and the Press:
Keeping First Amendment Values in Balance, 2002 UTAH L. REV. 177, 202 (“The
Establishment Clause limitation protects against a particular religion or group of
religions commandeering the state in a manner that infringes on the liberty of
conscience of others” and the “free exercise limitation, in turn, protects the right to act
upon one’s religious conscience unless, in the words of James Madison, ‘the
preservation of equal liberty, and the existence of the State be manifestly
endangered.’ ”).
12
Professor William P. Marshall has offered a suggestive but underdeveloped
and at times problematic argument for applying the justification from truth to religious
expression. William P. Marshall, Truth and the Religion Clauses 43 DEPAUL L. REV.
243, 244, 255-60 (1994). In this Article, I will sometimes explicitly mention our

6
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justification from truth, given its heuristic power, deserves to
be applied to religious expression, and I try to offer a robust
account of what that would look like.13 In Part I, I distinguish
what I call the minimalist and deliberative approaches of the
justification from truth. The former, I argue, lacks the
insistence on deliberation over a diversity of viewpoints that
defines the latter. For this reason, I recommend the application
of the deliberative version to religious expression. I clarify in
Part II what challenges, if any, religious expression might
present for the justification from truth given that the
justification has been generally applied to secular speech. In
Part III, I urge the merits of applying the deliberative version
of the justification from truth by enlisting examples from
religious conversion.
I begin in Part IV the needful work of explaining how
the Supreme Court has provided a long line of case law that
can be conscripted to bolster my efforts to extend the
justification from truth to discourses pertaining to religion. The
Court has applied the justification from truth to political
speech and commercial speech based partly on the assumption
that politics and commerce are such important subjects that
the audience deserves access to a diversity of viewpoints and
ideas. So, too, the Court has also concluded, as I show in Part
IV, that religion is at least as important as politics and
commerce, a conclusion that has provided a path for me to
extend the justification from truth to religion. I explain in
Part V that the religion clauses, as interpreted by the Court,
forbid the state from invading the privacy necessary for
individuals to weigh competing religious perspectives, and,
accordingly, the Court has afforded the legal means by which
people may, without undue interference from the state,
deliberate about a diversity of viewpoints and ideas about
religion. In Part VI, I apply the justification from truth to a set
of test cases to demonstrate how it can be used: cases involving
proselytism, unemployment benefits, the flag salute, religious
differences; other times I will simply offer, for efficiency’s sake, my own competing
argument without referencing his. For instance, he does not differentiate between the
two versions of the justification from truth. I consider the distinction crucial and
explain why, albeit with only a passing reference to the fact that he makes no such
distinction. See infra Part I. For an example of where I explicitly address our
differences, see infra Part VI.C.1.
13
This does not mean that I necessarily seek to preempt other justifications
for religious speech. My chief aim is to describe in detail one plausible justification for
it which has been given relatively little attention.
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fundamentalism, and the teaching of creation science. I
conclude in Part VII.
Before I begin making a case for applying the
justification from truth to religious expression, I should more
fully define the justification. I can begin by borrowing from
Professor Frederick Schauer’s definition of the justification
from truth:
Throughout the ages many diverse arguments have been employed
to attempt to justify a principle of freedom of speech. Of all these, the
predominant and most persevering has been the argument that free
speech is particularly valuable because it leads to the discovery of
truth. Open discussion, free exchange of ideas, freedom of enquiry,
and freedom to criticize, so the argument goes, are necessary
conditions for the effective functioning of the process of searching for
truth. Without this freedom we are said to be destined to stumble
blindly between truth and falsehood. With it we can identify truth
and reject falsity in any area of human enquiry.14

This account of the justification from truth is a standard one
and is relatively uncontroversial as far as the faithfulness of its
description. But there is disagreement about what qualifies as
truth and what are the expectations for free speech to help the
audience arrive at it.
This disagreement has organized itself in the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence around two dominant approaches to the
justification from truth: the minimalist approach and the
deliberative approach. I will explain both approaches in the
next section.
I.

DELIBERATION IS AT THE CORE OF THE JUSTIFICATION

In this section, I will summarize and assess what I call
the Supreme Court’s minimalist and deliberative approaches to
secular free speech, and then I will argue in Section III that the
latter approach is more likely to help us arrive at better
conclusions about religious truth. The minimalist approach
does not assume that deliberation over competing viewpoints is
necessary or perhaps even useful for arriving at the truth. By
contrast, the deliberative approach, as its name suggests,
values such deliberation.
The history of the justification from truth in the United
States Supreme Court finds its initial form in the minimalist
approach and the topic of its consideration in political speech.
14

SCHAUER, supra note 1, at 15.
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And the minimalist approach, like other significant modes of
thought in American jurisprudence, begins for the Court with
the towering authority of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
Representative is his dissent in Gitlow v. New York.15 Gitlow
was, in the words of the Supreme Court, “a member of the Left
Wing Section of the Socialist Party, a dissenting branch or
faction of that party formed in opposition to its dominant policy
of ‘moderate Socialism.’”16 The lower court convicted him of
“advocacy of criminal anarchy,” a decision upheld by the
Supreme Court, which found that Gitlow’s speech posed a
“clear and present danger” that could be lawfully prohibited.17
Dissenting, Holmes first summarized the position of Justice
Sanford who wrote the majority opinion: “It is said that this
manifesto was more than a theory, that it was an incitement.”18
But according to Holmes, Sanford’s description was unduly
expansive because “[e]very idea is an incitement.”19 Every idea,
he announced, “offers itself for belief and if believed it is acted
on unless some other belief outweighs it or some failure of
energy stifles the movement at its birth.”20 And Holmes wrote
that the “only difference between the expression of an opinion
and an incitement in the narrower sense is the speaker’s
enthusiasm for the result. Eloquence may set fire to reason.”21
These remarks probably appear to afford great
protection for free speech, but the logic of Holmes’s opinion,
when carefully considered, presents a troubling upshot. While
Holmes felt that the subversive speech in this case “had no
chance of starting a present conflagration,” he nonetheless
asserted that “[i]f in the long run the beliefs expressed in
proletarian dictatorship are destined to be accepted by the
dominant forces of the community, the only meaning of free
speech is that they should be given their chance and have their
way.”22 Notice the breezy, if indifferent, attitude of the
statement. According to Holmes, the “only meaning of free
speech” is that people be permitted to hear a particular
perspective, not that they mull over it or compare it with other
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

268 U.S. 652 (1925).
Id. at 655.
Id. at 654, 671-72.
Id. at 673.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 673.
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options.23 On offer by Holmes is a formulation of the
justification from truth that does not insist on the usefulness of
deliberation and, accordingly, it also does not insist on a
diversity of viewpoints, for deliberation is the “consideration
and discussion of the reasons for and against a measure by a
number of councilors.”24 Holmes’s version of the justification
from truth is perfectly willing to ascribe political legitimacy to
a superficial conclusion derived from glossing over a set of
numbingly similar ideas and viewpoints.25
While the justification from truth, on Holmes’s account,
need not logically require deliberation, conclusions that are
drawn without the benefit of seriously weighing competing
arguments are potentially unsound because they have failed to
withstand meaningful scrutiny. The nineteenth-century
23
Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 673; see also SUNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 26 (“In all his
writings on free speech, Holmes pays little attention to the appropriate conditions
under which free trade in ideas will ensure truth, a gap that is probably attributable to
his skepticism about whether truth, as an independent value, is at issue at all.”). Some
scholars have ascribed Holmes’s experience in the Civil War to his seeming apathy or
skepticism concerning the existence of objective truths. See BOLLINGER, supra note 2,
at 162 (arguing that Holmes’s contempt for intolerant men is “in part the product of
Holmes’s experience as a soldier in the Civil War—that belief is a straight road to
killing one another”).
24
4 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 414 (J. A. Simpson & E. S. C. Weiner eds.,
1989).
25
Some scholars have awkwardly associated Holmes with the philosophers
John Stuart Mill and John Milton in that all three are said to be dedicated to the
justification from truth. Stanley Ingber, for example, writes:

Scholars and jurists frequently have used the image of a “marketplace of
ideas” to explain and justify the first amendment freedoms of speech and
press. Although this classic image of competing ideas and robust debate dates
back to English philosophers John Milton and John Stuart Mill, Justice
Holmes first introduced the concept into American jurisprudence in his 1919
dissent to Abrams v. United States.
Ingber, supra note 3, at 2-3 (footnotes omitted). Similarly, William Marshall explains:
According to seminal case law interpreting the Speech Clause, freedom of
expression promotes truth by fostering a “marketplace of ideas” which
enables truth to ultimately prevail over falsity. The source of this theory is
traditionally thought to be a famous passage from John Milton’s work
Areopagitica. . . . The source of the truth rationale in First Amendment
doctrine in turn may be found in Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s classic
dissent in Abrams v. United States . . . .
Marshall, supra note 12, at 256-57 (footnotes omitted). These associations between
Holmes, on the one hand, and Milton and Mill, on the other, can be somewhat
misleading. For Milton and Mill offered a distinctly different version of the justification
from truth than the one announced by Holmes. Specifically, the former emphasized the
need for deliberation over a diversity of viewpoints whereas the latter two did not. See
infra note 27 and accompanying text (discussing Mill); see also infra Part III.B.1
(discussing Milton).

10
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English philosopher John Stuart Mill is helpful on this score.26
Mill offered four arguments for why a diversity of ideas and
viewpoints is essential for arriving at close, albeit provisional,
approximations of the truth:
First, if any opinion is compelled to silence, that opinion may, for
aught we can certainly know, be true. To deny this is to assume our
own infallibility. Second, though the silenced opinion be an error, it
may, and very commonly does, contain a portion of truth; and since
the general or prevailing opinion on any subject is rarely or never
the whole truth, it is only by the collision of adverse opinions that
the remainder of the truth has any chance of being supplied. Third,
even if the received opinion be not only true, but the whole truth;
unless it is suffered to be, and actually is, vigorously and earnestly
contested, it will, by most of those who receive it, be held in the
manner of a prejudice, with little comprehension or feeling of its
rational grounds. And not only this, but, fourthly, the meaning of the
doctrine itself will be in danger of being lost, or enfeebled, and
deprived of its vital effect on the character and conduct: the dogma
becoming a mere formal profession, inefficacious for good, but
cumbering the ground, and preventing the growth of any real and
heartfelt conviction, from reason or personal experience.27

In proffering these arguments, Mill does not suggest that a
diversity of views will necessarily lead to truth but that a
paucity of them will almost surely doom us to half-truths and
ignorance.
While Holmes’s minimalist approach to the justification
from truth is absent Mill’s insights, the emphasis on
deliberation over a diversity of viewpoints does find root in a
different version of the justification from truth, what I call the
deliberative approach. This approach tries to use the law to
foster and protect a diversity of viewpoints, and it expects
people to deliberate about them to arrive at better conclusions
about truth.
While he is certainly not the only person in history to
have advocated the deliberative approach, Justice Louis
Brandeis, Holmes’s good friend and frequent interlocutor, is
26
The Supreme Court justices have sometimes explicitly invoked Mill as
authority for their use of the justification from truth. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995); Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 900 (1994); Columbia
Broad. Sys. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 189 (1973) (Brennan J.,
dissenting); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 392 (1969); New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272, 279 (1964); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 514-15
(1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 151 (1959)
(Black, J., dissenting); Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 241 (1951).
27
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY AND OTHER WRITINGS 53-54 (Stefan
Collini ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1995) (1859).
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one of the first on the Supreme Court to do so.28 Brandeis joined
some of Holmes’s memorable First Amendment opinions and
vice versa,29 but the former advanced a decidedly different
justification from truth. Most importantly, while Holmes had
advocated a marketplace of ideas where consumers act, and
perhaps act impulsively, on their varied and subjective
preferences, Brandeis envisions a world where free speech can
theoretically enlighten civil society. The difference between
Holmes and Brandeis is most evident in the latter’s
concurrence in Whitney v. California.30 Brandeis wrote, “Those
who won our independence believed that the final end of the
state was to make men free to develop their faculties, and that
in its government the deliberative forces should prevail over
the arbitrary.”31 Implicit here is the aspiration that people will
bring to bear their deliberative faculties to adduce the truth.
By contrast, Holmes had remarked in Abrams v. United States
that “the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get
itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth
is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be
carried out.”32 Missing in this formulation of the justification
from truth is the insistence that people deliberate about an
issue at any length.33 Read straightforwardly, the only thing
that Holmes’s position requires is that the idea “get itself
accepted in the competition of the market,” even if the idea
commends its merits through little more than cheap emotional
pleas and a busy swirl of sound bites. Furthermore, Holmes
does not define what constitutes a properly functioning market
or even that he requires the market to be functioning

28

For considerably earlier intimations of the deliberative approach in a
religious setting, see John Milton’s work discussed infra Part III.B.1.
29
E.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
30
274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis & Holmes, JJ., concurring), overruled
in part by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
31
Id. at 375.
32
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
33
Cass Sunstein makes the following remarks about Holmes’s account of the
justification from truth:
Truth itself is defined by reference to what emerges through “free trade in
ideas.” For Holmes, it seems to have no deeper status. The competition of the
market is the governing conception of free speech. On his view, politics itself
is a market, like any other. Holmes does not appear to place any special
premium on political discussion.
SUNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 25.
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properly.34 He thus fails to explain if the justification from
truth can, for example, reduce the volume of speech by
financially powerful groups that can drown out their
competitors’ voices, or if the state may limit a parade of
salacious gossip about celebrities’ lives in favor of more
substantial information about the countless pressing issues in
politics and social welfare.
Unlike Holmes, Brandeis justifies free speech as a way
to help people arrive not simply at any conclusion about truth,
but at a more deliberative, more informed—and hence
presumably better—conclusion. His attitude is encapsulated in
these statements: “Men feared witches and burnt women. It is
the function of speech to free men from the bondage of
irrational fears.”35 Accordingly, Brandeis writes that “no danger
flowing from speech can be deemed clear and present, unless
the incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it
may befall before there is opportunity for full discussion.”36 So
too: “If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood
and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the
remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.”37
The references to “full discussion” and “more speech” would
seem to suggest the importance of a diversity of viewpoints in
the search for truth whereby “the deliberative forces should
prevail over the arbitrary.”38
The landmark case of New York Times v. Sullivan39
captures the spirit of the deliberative approach. In that case,
the Times had run an advertisement declaring that peaceful
34
Sunstein writes: “In all his writings on free speech, Holmes pays little
attention to the appropriate conditions under which free trade in ideas will ensure
truth, a gap that is probably attributable to his skepticism about whether truth, as an
independent value, is at issue at all.” Id.
35
Whitney, 274 U.S. at 376. For useful discussions of the Brandeis opinion,
see generally Vincent Blasi, The First Amendment and the Ideal of Civic Courage: The
Brandeis Opinion in Whitney v. California, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 653 (1988) and
JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 351-56 (1993). Justice Frankfurter subsequently
announced a similar observation:

The history of civilization is in considerable measure the displacement of
error which once held sway as official truth by beliefs which in turn have
yielded to other truths. Therefore the liberty of man to search for truth ought
not to be fettered, no matter what orthodoxies he may challenge.
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 550 (1951).
36
Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 375.
39
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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efforts at civil rights reform in Montgomery, Alabama and
elsewhere were being met “by an unprecedented wave of terror
by those who would deny and negate [the Constitution].”40 The
advertisement did not mention who specifically was responsible
for such terror, but one L. B. Sullivan, a city official responsible
for the Montgomery police, argued that he was falsely depicted
and sued the Times for libel. An Alabama jury awarded what
was then an exorbitant sum for libel in the amount of
$500,000.41 The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed.42 The United
States Supreme Court reversed the Alabama Supreme Court in
one of its most important First Amendment decisions. Justice
Brennan for the Court held that a public official like Sullivan
was subject to an “actual malice” standard, whereby he could
recover damages for libel only if he could show that the
defendant had made a false statement regarding the public
official acting within his official capacity and that the
statement had been made “with knowledge that it was false or
with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”43 Merely
publicizing some factual inaccuracy was thus insufficient to
establish liability, and even doing so “negligently” (that is,
below the standard of responsibility for a reasonable person)
was not enough.44 While the Court thus made public officials
remarkably vulnerable in the realm of public discourse, it did
so in order to ensure that “public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open, and that [public discourse] may well
include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp
attacks on government and public officials.”45 The diversity of
40
41
42

Id. at 256.
Id.
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 144 So. 2d 25, 52 (1962), rev’d, 376 U.S. 254

(1964).
43
44

Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 280.
Id. at 262. The Court clarified this aspect in St. Amant v. Thompson:

[R]eckless conduct is not measured by whether a reasonably prudent man
would have published, or would have investigated before publishing. There
must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in
fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication. Publishing
with such doubts shows reckless disregard for truth or falsity and
demonstrates actual malice.
390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
45
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270; see also William J. Brennan, Jr., The Supreme
Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1,
18-20 (1965) (relating the argument that the First Amendment right of free speech is
grounded in the people’s right of access to competing perspectives for purposes of
deliberation about self-government).
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viewpoints and ideas that the Court expected to be generated
by the protectiveness of the New York Times rule would
presumably help the audience arrive at better conclusions
about the truth.
A similar logic animates Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
46
FCC. In Red Lion, a radio station had personally attacked a
writer, calling him a liar and a communist.47 The writer sought
a right of reply under the personal attack rule of the FCC’s
Fairness Doctrine.48 In turn, the radio station argued that the
right of reply violated the First Amendment because it
impermissibly coerced the station to give air time to those
whom the station had refused.49 Justice White for the Court
upheld the personal attack rule because it was necessary for
people in a democracy to hear different sides of an issue. He
wrote that the
people as a whole retain their interest in free speech by radio and
their collective right to have the medium function consistently with
the ends and purposes of the First Amendment. It is the right of the
viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is
paramount. . . . It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve
an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately

46
395 U.S. 367 (1969). Owen Fiss has commented on the connection between
Sullivan and Red Lion:

Sullivan sought to enhance the capacity of the press to report widely and
fully on matters of public importance by shielding the press from a form of
state action—libel judgments—that might otherwise discourage such
reporting. The Fairness Doctrine [as construed by Red Lion] also sought to
broaden the coverage of the press, to make certain that the all-powerful
broadcast medium covered issues of public importance and gave listeners or
viewers all sides of the story. In upholding that doctrine and the power of the
FCC to regulate the press for the purpose of broadening public debate, Red
Lion affirmed the very same values proclaimed by Sullivan.
FISS, supra note 6, at 58.
47
Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 371-72.
48
The rule states:
When, during the presentation of views on a controversial issue of public
importance, an attack is made upon the honesty, character, integrity or like
personal qualities of an identified person or group, the licensee shall, within a
reasonable time and in no event later than 1 week after the attack, transmit
to the person or group attacked (1) notification of the date, time and
identification of the broadcast; (2) a script or tape (or an accurate summary if
a script or tape is not available) of the attack; and (3) an offer of a reasonable
opportunity to respond over the licensee’s facilities.
Id. at 373-74 (quoting 47 C.F.R. § 73.1920(a) (1996)).
49
Id. at 386.
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prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that market,
whether it be by the Government itself or a private licensee.50

The dedication to maintaining a marketplace of ideas helps to
justify the Court’s familiar prohibition against viewpoint
discrimination and, to a lesser degree, content discrimination.
To quote the Court, “above all else, the First Amendment
means that government has no power to restrict expression
because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its
content.”51 The Court would therefore prohibit the government
from permitting speakers to criticize the Republican Party but
not the Democratic party, for this would amount to
discrimination against a person’s political viewpoint. In fact,
the Court would also probably prohibit the government from
punishing any discussion of politics because the government
would be punishing people for the content of their speech. As
the Court explains, “Any restriction on expressive activity
because of its content would completely undercut the ‘profound
national commitment to the principle that debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.’”52
But the justification from truth in its deliberative form
is not exclusive to political speech. It also applies to commercial
speech. Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc.53 established the Court’s recognition
that commercial speech deserves First Amendment protection.
The case relies on the principle that consumers should have
access to diverse information that will help them arrive at
better conclusions about truth. Virginia’s legislature had
passed a statute that restricted pharmacists from advertising
or publishing, inter alia, the prices of the drugs that they sold.54
A group of consumers challenged the statute as violating their
First Amendment right to receive information about drug
prices, especially given that drug prices in Virginia, “for both
prescription and nonprescription items, strikingly vary from
outlet to outlet even within the same locality.”55 Justice
Blackmun for the Court struck down the statute as
unconstitutional. He offered the following justification:

50
51
52
53
54
55

Id. at 390.
Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
Id. at 96 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1964)).
425 U.S. 748 (1976).
See VA. CODE ANN. § 54-524.35 (1974).
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 754.
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As to the particular consumer’s interest in the free flow of
commercial information, that interest may be as keen, if not keener
by far, than his interest in the day’s most urgent political debate. . . .
Those whom the suppression of prescription drug price information
hits the hardest are the poor, the sick, and particularly the aged. A
disproportionate amount of their income tends to be spent on
prescription drugs; yet they are the least able to learn, by shopping
from pharmacist to pharmacist, where their scarce dollars are best
spent.56

To this pressing interest by drug consumers, Blackmun added
a more general reason:
Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it sometimes may
seem, is nonetheless dissemination of information as to who is
producing and selling what product, for what reason, and at what
price. So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise
economy, the allocation of our resources in large measure will be
made through numerous private economic decisions. It is a matter of
public interest that those decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent
and well informed. To this end, the free flow of commercial
information is indispensable. And if it is indispensable to the proper
allocation of resources in a free enterprise system, it is also
indispensable to the formation of intelligent opinions as to how that
system ought to be regulated or altered.57

Of course, the state may sometimes regulate commercial
speech to ensure the safety of the consumers, but Blackmun
explained that in this instance the statute was “highly
paternalistic.”58 Here, he concluded, we should assume that the
information “is not in itself harmful, that people will perceive
their own best interests if only they are well enough informed,
and that the best means to that end is to open the channels of
communication rather than to close them.”59 Phrased more
directly in terms of the deliberative approach, Blackmun’s
justification for protecting commercial speech presupposes that
consumers are likely to make better decisions if they have
access to competing advertisements.
Blackmun’s opinion, like the opinions of the other
justices that I examined, turns on cases in which the First
Amendment’s right of free speech is front and center. But the
justification in its deliberative form is present elsewhere, too,
and a most conspicuous place is the Court’s college and

56
57
58
59

Id. at 763.
Id. at 765 (citations omitted).
Id. at 770.
Id.
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university affirmative action cases. While the Supreme Court
in these cases focused mostly on the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Equal Protection Clause rather than the First Amendment’s
right of free speech, what deserves attention is that the Court’s
support of affirmative action in this context is premised on
creating conditions that will be favorable for the exchange and
deliberation of diverse ideas and viewpoints.
This thesis was first offered in Justice Powell’s plurality
opinion in Regents of University of California v. Bakke.60 In that
case, the University of California, Davis Medical School
reserved a number of admissions seats for those candidates
who belonged to certain racial groups.61 Justice Powell rejected
this policy as violating the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause.62 He subjected the quota policy to strict
scrutiny because it contained a suspect classification in race.63
Under strict scrutiny, the medical school was required to show
that there existed a compelling government interest for its
policy and that the policy’s means were necessary.64 After
rejecting three of the four justifications presented by the
medical school as failing to demonstrate a compelling
government interest for the racial quota, Powell accepted as a
compelling government interest the university’s goal of
furthering a diversity of viewpoints on its campus. He wrote:
The fourth goal asserted by petitioner is the attainment of a diverse
student body. This clearly is a constitutionally permissible goal for
an institution of higher education. Academic freedom, though not a
specifically enumerated constitutional right, long has been viewed as
a special concern of the First Amendment. The freedom of a
university to make its own judgments as to education includes the
selection of its student body.65

Powell elaborated on this point:
Thus, in arguing that its universities must be accorded the right to
select those students who will contribute the most to the “robust
exchange of ideas,” petitioner invokes a countervailing constitutional
60

438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring).
Id. at 289.
62
Id. at 309-10 (Powell, J., concurring).
63
“We have held that in ‘order to justify the use of a suspect classification, a
State must show that its purpose or interest is both constitutionally permissible and
substantial, and that its use of the classification is “necessary . . . to the
accomplishment” of its purpose or the safeguarding of its interest.’ ” Id. at 305 (quoting
In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1973) (footnotes omitted)).
64
Id.
65
Id. at 311-12.
61

18

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:1

interest, that of the First Amendment. In this light, petitioner must
be viewed as seeking to achieve a goal that is of paramount
importance in the fulfillment of its mission.66

To explain how this exchange of ideas might occur, Justice
Powell quoted from an article by President William Bowen of
Princeton University:
[A] great deal of learning occurs informally. It occurs through
interactions among students of both sexes; of different races,
religions, and backgrounds; who come from cities and rural areas,
from various states and countries; who have a wide variety of
interests, talents, and perspectives; and who are able, directly or
indirectly, to learn from their differences and to stimulate one
another to reexamine even their most deeply held assumptions about
themselves and their world. As a wise graduate of ours observed in
commenting on this aspect of the educational process, “People do not
learn very much when they are surrounded only by the likes of
themselves.”67

One finds in this passage a reiteration of the justification from
truth. For the diversity of viewpoints helps students “to learn
from their differences and to stimulate one another to
reexamine even their most deeply held assumptions about
themselves and their world.”68
In the subsequent cases of Grutter v. Bollinger69 and
Gratz v. Bollinger,70 the Court reaffirmed Justice Powell’s signal
66

Id. at 313.
Id. at 312 (quoting William Bowen, Admissions and the Relevance of Race,
Princeton Alumni Wkly., Sept. 26, 1977, at 9); see also Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of
the Univ. of the State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (“The classroom is peculiarly
the ‘marketplace of ideas.’ The Nation’s future depends upon leaders trained through
wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth ‘out of a
multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative selection.’ ”). For
a similar treatment, see the Court’s opinion in Sweezy v. New Hampshire:
67

The essentiality of freedom in the community of American universities is
almost self-evident. No one should underestimate the vital role in a
democracy that is played by those who guide and train our youth. To impose
any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges and universities
would imperil the future of our Nation. No field of education is so thoroughly
comprehended by man that new discoveries cannot yet be made. Particularly
is that true in the social sciences, where few, if any, principles are accepted
as absolutes. Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and
distrust. Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to study
and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our
civilization will stagnate and die.
354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).
68
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313 n.48 (Powell, J., concurring).
69
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003).
70
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 271 (2003).
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appreciation for the value of promoting a diversity of
viewpoints in colleges and universities. Grutter involved a
challenge to the admissions policy of the University of
Michigan Law School, which took race into consideration, and
Gratz involved a similar challenge to the admissions policy of
Michigan’s College of Letters, Science, and the Arts, which also
accepted racial minority status as a positive factor, albeit, to
the Court’s chagrin, much more heavily than did the law
school.71 While the Court upheld the law school’s policy and
rejected the college’s policy, it endorsed in both cases Powell’s
aspiration to create a diversity of viewpoints in colleges and
universities. In Gratz, the Court rejected the admissions policy
of the College of Letters, Science, and the Arts because, in the
Court’s view, instead of trying to promote a diversity of
viewpoints, it was an obvious attempt at social engineering by
giving disproportionate advantages to members of certain
racial groups.72 In Grutter, the Court stated that it “endorses
Justice Powell’s view that student body diversity is a
compelling state interest in the context of university
admissions.”73 In fact, there was a sustained concurrence by
Justice O’Connor that built upon Powell’s reasoning. She
wrote:
[T]he Law School defines its critical mass concept by reference to the
substantial, important, and laudable educational benefits that
diversity is designed to produce, including cross-racial understanding
and the breaking down of racial stereotypes. The Law School’s claim
is further bolstered by numerous expert studies and reports showing
that such diversity promotes learning outcomes and better prepares
students for an increasingly diverse work force, for society, and for
the legal profession. Major American businesses have made clear
that the skills needed in today’s increasingly global marketplace can
only be developed through exposure to widely diverse people,
71
72

Id. at 253-54; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 314-17.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, explained:

Even if student C’s “extraordinary artistic talent” rivaled that of Monet or
Picasso, the applicant would receive, at most, five points under the LSA’s
system. At the same time, every single underrepresented minority applicant,
including students A and B, would automatically receive 20 points for
submitting an application. . . . Instead of considering how the differing
backgrounds, experiences, and characteristics of students A, B, and C might
benefit the University, admissions counselors reviewing LSA applications
would simply award both A and B 20 points because their applications
indicate that they are African-American, and student C would receive up to 5
points for his “extraordinary talent.”
Gratz, 539 U.S. at 273 (citation and footnote omitted).
73
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 307.
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cultures, ideas, and viewpoints. High-ranking retired officers and
civilian military leaders assert that a highly qualified, racially
diverse officer corps is essential to national security. Moreover,
because universities, and in particular, law schools, represent the
training ground for a large number of the Nation’s leaders, the path
to leadership must be visibly open to talented and qualified
individuals of every race and ethnicity.74

As the passage suggests, Grutter, along with most of the other
cases that I have examined, stands for the proposition that a
diversity of viewpoints and ideas is more likely than their
paucity to lead to truth. The cases suggest, then, that the
deliberative approach is more likely than the minimalist
approach to help the audience arrive at better conclusions
about the truth.
But all of the cases that I have examined thus far
concerned secular speech. The question remains: Is the
deliberative approach a better alternative than the minimalist
approach in helping people to make more justifiable
conclusions about religious truth? I make the case that it is in
Parts II and III.
II.

COMPARING SECULAR AND RELIGIOUS SPEECH

Before I directly discuss whether a diversity of
viewpoints and ideas concerning religion can lead to more
justifiable conclusions about religious truth, I will first offer
what I think are easier examples outside of religion. Using
these easier examples, I will explain later what is potentially
different about religion, and thus, what adjustments, if any,
should be made in applying to religion the deliberative version
of the justification from truth.
The work of political scientist Scott Page is a good place
to begin to think about how a diversity of viewpoints and ideas
can help people to arrive at better conclusions about some
truth.75 Page argues that we should imagine different
viewpoints and ideas as “tools” by which we can arrive at better
approximations about the truth.76 He suggests that we are
more likely to arrive at accurate conclusions if we possess a

74

Id. at 308 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
See generally SCOTT E. PAGE, THE DIFFERENCE: HOW THE POWER OF
DIVERSITY CREATES BETTER GROUPS, FIRMS, SCHOOLS, AND SOCIETIES (2007).
76
Page calls his argument the “diversity conjecture” and holds that “diversity
leads to better outcomes.” Id. at 4.
75
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diversity of mental tools with which we can examine an issue.77
Among the tools are “diverse perspectives” that are “ways of
representing situations and problems.”78 “Informally speaking,
perspectives represent solutions to a problem. When we say
that people have diverse perspectives, we mean that they see or
envision the set of possibilities differently.”79
As an example, Page uses directions to the venerable
Zingerman’s Delicatessen in Ann Arbor, Michigan:
Isabelle, an Ann Arbor resident, might represent a location relative
to her home—“To get to Zingerman’s, go down State Street and take
a left in front of the big Catholic Church.” Her brother, Nicky, might
represent those same locations using a mental map of city streets—
“Zingerman’s sits on the corner of Kingsley and Detroit.” Given their
perspectives, Nicky would prove far more capable of telling a visitor
how to get from Zingerman’s to the Brown Jug, another Ann Arbor
landmark.80

We can embellish this example. Elise, a graphic artist, might
believe that Zingerman’s is a little difficult to spot without a
good illustration and so may draw the orange façade of the
building that houses it. Or, Samson, who is blind, might tell
you that when his roommate drives him there, Samson knows
that he is getting close to Zingerman’s because about five
hundred feet from the deli, the smooth asphalt suddenly
changes to a bumpy brick road with a couple of small potholes.
These examples are not meant to imply that one perspective is
better than another, but to suggest that someone looking for
directions to Zingerman’s is likely to find a diversity of
perspectives to be more useful than just one.81 And notice how
one perspective builds on another: Isabelle’s perspective would
get you started on State Street and past the big Catholic
Church; then Nicky’s would help you to locate Kingsley Street;
then as you keep going on Kingsley, you notice that Samson
was right and that the asphalt has changed to an uneven brick
road; and then you notice near Detroit Street the only orange
brick building. And there you are at Zingerman’s.

77

Id. at 9-11.
Id. at 7.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
This is probably why Google and Yahoo print out driving directions that
contain both maps and written directions. http://maps.google.com/maps and
http://maps.yahoo.com/index.php (both last visited Feb. 23, 2007).
78
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But different perspectives can help us with more than
driving directions. They can help us with something as
formalistic as math, too. Professor Page offers this example
from an IQ test82:
In each sequence, replace the X with the unique number that makes
the sequence logically consistent.
Sequence 1:

1

4

9

16

X

36

Sequence 2:

1

2

3

5

X

13

Sequence 3:

1

2

6

X

1,806

The first sequence is a sequence of squares.83 “The square of 1
equals 1, the square of 2 equals 4, and so on. The missing
number is 25.”84 But the perspective in Sequence 1—the
sequence of squares—cannot help us with Sequence 2. That
requires a different perspective:
The perspective that makes sense of this sequence is to recognize
each number as the difference of the two that follow it. The first
number equals the third number minus the second (1 = 3 – 2), the
second number equals the fourth minus the third (2 = 5 – 3), and so
on. It follows that the fifth should be such that it minus the fourth
number, 5, equals the third number, 3. Therefore, the missing
number is 8.85

Sequence 3 is much harder than Sequences 1 and 2: How is it
possible to go from the small numbers of 1, 2, and 6 and then
jump suddenly to the large number of 1,806? Page responds,
“We can find the answer by combining the perspectives
developed to solve the first two sequences.”86 To wit:
First, apply the perspective used in the second sequence: Look at the
differences between numbers. The difference between the first two
numbers equals 1 (2 – 1 = 1). The difference between the second two
numbers is 4 (6 – 2 = 4). This suggests a pattern. That pattern is the
perspective used to solve the first sequence: squares. Each number
differs from the number after it by an amount equal to its square 1 =
2 – 12, and 2 = 6 – 22. This idea seems cute, but it doesn’t seem as
though it will get us to 1,806. And yet it does. Using this rule, the
next number would be 42, 6 = 42 – 62, and the number after 42
would be (guess what) 1,806: 42 = 1,806 – 422 (422 = 1,764).

82
83
84
85
86

PAGE, supra note 75, at 42.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 43.
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Combining our two perspectives, we can make sense of the third
sequence.87

There are more examples of times when a diversity of
perspectives helped people to better discern the truth. During
World War II, Britain vexed over how to crack the Nazi’s secret
code by which, among other things, German submarines were
communicating with each other to track and destroy Ally
supply ships.88 Realizing that a team of expert cryptographers
was inadequate to solve the code, the British government
sought to exploit what Page has called the diversity of
perspectives.89 It assembled a motley group in Bletchley Park:
Many of the people brought to Bletchley Park—Brits, Americans,
Poles, Aussies—had training we might think appropriate for code
breaking. These included mathematicians . . . , engineers, and
cryptographers. But other people working in secrecy in the James
Bond-like trappings of Room 40 and Hut 8 had been trained as
language experts, moral philosophers, classicists, ancient historians,
and even crossword puzzle experts.90

The end result was that the diverse lot twice cracked the Nazi
code.91
In private industry, there is the example of
InnoCentive.92 In 2001, Alpheus Bingham, the vice president of
Eli Lilly, created a website called InnoCentive where large
pharmaceutical companies could post problems for anyone, not
just scientists who specialize in drugs, to solve for a monetary
reward.93 “Solvers included dentists from the Far East and
physicists from the Midwest.”94 By 2005, “more than eighty
thousand solvers had registered[,]”95 hailing “from more than
170 countries and span[ning] the scientific disciplines.”96 These
nonexperts solved nearly one-third of the problems,97 an
impressive number considering that their services were
typically sought by “a company like Proctor and Gamble, which

87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97

Id.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 1.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Id.
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has nine thousand people as its R&D staff and spend nearly
two billion dollars a year on research and development.”98
Similarly, the discovery of the structure of DNA was
achieved by an unlikely team whose members held perspectives
that differed sharply from each other’s and from those of others
deemed experts in the field. Francis Crick and James Watson
would eventually win the Nobel Prize for their discovery, but
their intellectual backgrounds would not have suggested they
would.99 For Crick’s training did not focus solely on biology but
also on physics and chemistry; perhaps because of his diverse
interests, he had never earned a Ph.D.100 Watson did have a
Ph.D., but it was in zoology with an emphasis on the study of
birds.101 These unorthodox backgrounds were not debilitating to
their research and in fact “[h]istorians of science assign credit
to . . . their diverse skills.”102
Such stories of diverse perspectives are telling, but are
the lessons gleaned from them useful for my topic of religious
truth? I believe they are, but I should now explain their
limitations and thus begin to outline how a diversity of
viewpoints and ideas should be properly understood in the
context of religious truth.
All of the examples from Page that I have used involve
people trying to solve puzzles which admit of answers that are
formally logical, as in the mathematical sequence and the
cracking of the Nazi code, or they are empirically testable, as in
the InnoCentive website and the directions to Zingerman’s. But
questions about a truth concerning religion are not generally
amenable to formal logic or empiricism. This is so for at least
two reasons. First, religion deals with questions of moral value,
whereas all of the examples that I have borrowed from Page
deal with questions of fact.103
98
99
100
101
102
103

PAGE, supra note 75, at 2.
Id. at 29.
Id.
Id.
Id.
The zoologist Stephen Jay Gould explains:

I do not see how science and religion could be unified, or even synthesized,
under any common scheme of explanation or analysis; but I also do not
understand why the two enterprises should experience any conflict. Science
tries to document the factual character of the natural world, and to develop
theories that coordinate and explain these facts. Religion, on the other hand,
operates in the equally important, but utterly different, realm of human
purposes, meanings, and values—subjects that the factual domain of science
might illuminate, but can never resolve. Similarly, while scientists must
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Second, religion tends to rest on faith in the existence of
a Higher Being or Beings whose very definition resists and
transcends the properties of formal logic and empirical
reality.104 So Charles Darwin wrote six months after his Origin
of Species105 and after the death of his beloved daughter:
There seems to me too much misery in the world . . . . On the other
hand, I cannot anyhow be contented to view this wonderful universe,
and especially the nature of man, and to conclude that everything is
the result of brute force. I am inclined to look at everything as
resulting from designed laws, with the details, whether good or bad,
left to the working out of what we may call chance. Not that this
notion at all satisfies me. I feel most deeply that the whole subject is

operate with ethical principles, some specific to their practice, the validity of
these principles can never be inferred from the factual discoveries of science.
STEPHEN JAY GOULD, ROCKS OF AGES: SCIENCE AND RELIGION IN THE FULLNESS OF LIFE
4-5 (1999). On the other end of the spectrum from Gould is the self-styled agnostic
Keith Ward, an ordained minister of the Church of England as well as a theology
professor at Oxford. Yet the latter’s remarks are largely consistent with the former’s:
Modern science begins with the ejection of purpose, value and significance
from the universe. This is one main reason why the “scientific worldview”
fails to deal with all aspects of reality. The “disenchantment of nature,” the
stripping away of all personal properties from the mechanisms of nature, was
important to the birth of modern science.
KEITH WARD, PASCAL’S FIRE: SCIENTIFIC FAITH AND RELIGIOUS UNDERSTANDING 116
(2006).
104
Here, it is worth considering the following examples in which religious
founders have discovered God:
The founders of all the great religious traditions are said to have experienced
“knowing” in the form of revelations which guided or confirmed them in their
mission. Moses talked with Jehovah, Christ heard the voice of God at his
baptism, Mohammed was visited by the Angel Gabriel. Even the Buddha,
whose enlightenment is reported as arising from his own Buddha nature
rather than from heavenly grace, is described in the early Pali text, the
Ariyapariyesana Sutta, as having overcome his reluctance to teach others the
way to enlightenment—teachings which he considered lay beyond their
understanding—only in response to the repeated appeals from Brahma, one
of the supreme gods, who came down from heaven for this very purpose.
Other, lesser figures, have also claimed knowledge conveyed through divine
revelation, sometimes with consequences that have changed the whole course
of human history as in the case of Joan of Arc’s voices and St. Paul’s
experiences on the road to Damascus.
DAVID FONTANA, PSYCHOLOGY, RELIGION, AND SPIRITUALITY 21 (2003). Keith Ward also
observes that religions “can differ greatly from one another, but a central, if not
absolutely universal, theme is the existence of a supernatural realm in relation to
which some form of human fulfillment can be found.” KEITH WARD, THE CASE FOR
RELIGION 21 (2004).
105
CHARLES DARWIN, THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES (Julian Huxley ed., Signet
Classics 2003) (1859).
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too profound for the human intellect. A dog might as well speculate
on the mind of Newton.106

Thus, Darwin acknowledged the existence of a higher being
beyond comprehension by the human mind.
True, scientific theories like evolution do challenge
biblical accounts of human origins and do possess empirically
testable properties.107 Yet such theories, even if accurate,
cannot logically begin to refute the existence of a Higher Being
who has made such evolution possible.108 Moreover, some
106
Quoted in GOULD, supra note 103, at 35-36. So, too, the theologian Keith
Ward also explains:

What scientists deal with is the measurable, predictable and regular
operation of objects, as such objects exercise their natural powers in
interaction with other objects . . . . What science cannot do is prove that no
other sorts of reality exist, or prove that physical objects only ever act in the
predictable and regular ways with which science deals.
There are, then, very real limits to science. This is not a matter of things
science cannot yet do but might one day do. It is a matter of the limits science
imposes upon itself, in confining itself to public observation, repeatability,
law-like regularity and measurability. One extreme form of the scientific
worldview is the belief that this is the only sort of knowledge there is and the
only sort of reality there is. But that could not be a scientific statement, since
it is meta-scientific, a statement about what science is and deals with.
Perhaps there are other sorts of reality than the public and physical, and
perhaps even the public and physical contains supra-scientific elements. Most
religious views do take that alternative view. In doing so, they do not conflict
with science. They conflict with reductive materialism, with the belief that
nothing exists except matter.
WARD, supra note 103, at 127.
107
See infra Part VI.C.2.
108
Pope John Paul II, for instance, believed that evolution and Catholicism
were conceptually compatible. He wrote: “[M]y predecessor [Pope] Pius XII had already
stated [in 1950] that there was no opposition between evolution and the doctrine of the
faith about man and his vocation.” Quoted in GOULD, supra note 103, at 80-81. John
Paul also declared:
The Bible itself speaks to us of the origin of the universe and its make-up, not
in order to provide us with a scientific treatise but in order to state the
correct relationships of man with God and with the universe. Scared
Scripture wishes simply to declare that the world was created by God, and in
order to reach this truth it expresses itself in the terms of the cosmology in
use at the time of the writer. The Sacred Book likewise wishes to tell men
that the world was not created as the seat of the gods, as was taught by other
cosmogonies and cosmologies, but was rather created for the service of man
and the glory of God. Any other teaching about the origin and make-up of the
universe is alien to the intentions of the Bible, which does not wish to teach
how the heavens were made but how one goes to heaven.
Pope John Paul II, Address to the Pontifical Academy of Science (Oct. 1981) quoted in
Michael Ruse, Introduction to The Creationist Challenge, in BUT IS IT SCIENCE? THE
PHILOSOPHICAL QUESTION IN THE CREATION/EVOLUTION CONTROVERSY 225, 225
(Michael Ruse ed., 1996) [hereinafter BUT IS IT SCIENCE?]. And, perhaps surprisingly,
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religionists may refuse altogether to entertain the theory of
evolution because they are adamantly confident that the
epistemic resources of faith alone can answer questions about
the meaning of human existence.109
Religious truth, then, unlike the truths that were
sought by Watson and Crick or the Bletchley Park code
breakers, does not necessarily lend itself to the possibility of
universal assent.110 While everyone knows that a given number
is X in a mathematical sequence or that we have arrived at the
orange brick building that is Zingerman’s, we have
fundamental differences about whether we have found God or
Charles Darwin also believed that evolution did not logically dislodge the existence of a
god. The philosopher of science Michael Ruse, an authority on the evolution debate, has
remarked:
Given that religion provided such a barrier to evolutionism for everyone else,
why should it have been no barrier to Darwin? Remember, this was a young
man who [during his college years] had intended to be a parson, no less . . . .
[U]ltimately Darwin did not see religion and evolution in conflict! Rather, at
the time of becoming an evolutionist and indeed right through the period
until after the writing of the Origin [of the Species], Darwin was quite happy
to hold simultaneously to his scientific beliefs and to some rather lukewarm
kind of belief in a creator.
MICHAEL RUSE, DARWINISM DEFENDED: A GUIDE TO THE EVOLUTION CONTROVERSIES
26-27 (1982) [hereinafter RUSE, DARWINISM DEFENDED]. More strongly, Ruse writes:
“Can a Darwinian be a Christian? Absolutely! Is it always easy for a Darwinian to be a
Christian? No, but whoever said that the worthwhile things in life are easy?” MICHAEL
RUSE, CAN A DARWINIAN BE A CHRISTIAN? THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SCIENCE AND
RELIGION 217 (2001). The psychologist Gordon Allport similarly believes that religion
and the empirical demands of psychology need not be mutually exclusive:
As every reader knows, modern empirical psychology initially separated itself
sharply from religion. “Psychology without a soul” became its badge of
distinction and of pride.
....
At the same time there is inherent absurdity in supposing that psychology
and religion, both dealing with the outward reaching of man’s mind, must be
permanently and hopelessly at odds. As different as are science and art in
their axioms and methods they have learned to co-operate in a thousand
ways—in the production of finer dwellings, music, clothing, design. Why
should not science and religion, likewise differing in axioms and method, yet
co-operate in the production of an improved human character without which
all other human gains are tragic loss?
GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE INDIVIDUAL AND HIS RELIGION: A PSYCHOLOGICAL
INTERPRETATION v-vi (1950).
109
See infra Part VI.C.2 (discussing “scientific creationism” and its logical
defects). Stephen Jay Gould observes that such rejection of evolution constitutes “a
marginal belief among all major Western religions these days, and a doctrine only well
developed within the distinctively American context of Protestant church pluralism.”
GOULD, supra note 103, at 130.
110
The term “universal” however will be qualified later. See infra notes 112125 and accompanying notes.
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gods or His or Her or Its or Their Message or whether there is
any message at all to be found.111 When we conceive a diversity
of viewpoints and ideas in the context of religion, it is therefore
important to realize that we should not realistically expect
some collective “a-ha!” moment when all parties converge on an
indisputable answer.
Given this condition, the justification from truth would
seem an inappropriate fit for religious expression, at least if we
accept the characterization of the justification by some
scholars. For the justification from truth, according to these
scholars, must logically presuppose that there are “objective
truths” which can theoretically admit of uniform agreement.
Consider Professor Stanley Ingber’s account of the justification
from truth, which he subsequently used to criticize the
justification’s entire enterprise:
In order to be discoverable, however, truth must be an objective
rather than a subjective, chosen concept. Consequently,
socioeconomic status, experience, psychological propensities, and
societal roles should not influence an individual’s concept of truth. If
such factors do influence a listener’s perception of truth, the
inevitable differences in these perspectives caused by the vastly
differing experiences among individuals make resolution of
disagreement through simple discussion highly unlikely. And if the
possibility of rational discourse and discovery is negated by these
entrenched and irreconcilable perceptions of truth, the dominant
“truth” discovered by the marketplace can result only from the
triumph of power, rather than the triumph of reason.112

These needlessly austere expectations for the justification from
truth merit a response.
Ingber assumes that the justification from truth
promises to render truths devoid of “socioeconomic status,
111
The psychologist David Fontana has stated, “Beliefs and practices vary so
much between the major traditions that any attempt at defining religion can never be
wholly successful.” FONTANA, supra note 104, at 6. He continues, “Individual religions
not only differ considerably from each other in their understanding both of God or the
gods and of the soul . . . but also in a number of other important ways.” Id. at 7. Indeed,
for Fontana, the differences among religions “are so extreme that we may again
question whether all the traditions concerned should come under the one category of
religion . . . .” Id. at 8. See generally KEITH WARD, GOD: A GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED
(2002) (discussing the differences in religious beliefs among various religions
throughout Western history); OUR RELIGIONS (Arvind Sharma ed., 1993) (discussing
the differences among Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucianism, Taoism, Judaism,
Christianity, and Islam); HUSTON SMITH, THE WORLD’S RELIGIONS: OUR GREAT
WISDOM TRADITIONS (1991) (discussing the differences in religious meaning among
Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucianism, Taoism, Islam, Judaism, Christianity, and the
“primal religions”).
112
Ingber, supra note 3, at 15 (footnotes omitted).
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experience, psychological propensities, and societal roles.” But
this expectation, taken straightforwardly, is completely
implausible on its face. For there is no such truth. Even in
science, a field where one might anticipate only the cold
objectivity of facts, we encounter resistance to a conception of
truth that presumes the unassailability of its epistemology.
Indeed, as Thomas Kuhn has remarked in his famous work on
the history of science, the ostensibly objective truths that are
the products of science are necessarily influenced by the
contingencies
of
culture,
experience,
and
personal
idiosyncrasies.113 Accordingly, Kuhn is reluctant to ascribe
“objective truth” to any particular scientific discovery. He offers
the example of how Galileo’s description of motion differed from
that of the Aristotelian physicist:
Since remote antiquity most people have seen one or another heavy
body swinging back and forth on a string or chain until it finally
comes to rest. To the Aristotelians, who believed that a heavy body is
moved by its own nature from a higher position to a state of natural
rest at a lower one, the swinging body was simply falling with
difficulty. Constrained by the chain, it could achieve rest at its low
point only after a tortuous motion and a considerable time. Galileo,
on the other hand, looking at the swinging body, saw a pendulum, a
body that almost succeeded in repeating the same motion over and
over again ad infinitum. And having seen that much, Galileo
observed other properties of the pendulum as well and constructed
many of the most significant and original parts of his new dynamics
around them. From the properties of the pendulum, for example,
Galileo derived his only full and sound arguments for the
independence of weight and rate of fall, as well as for the
relationship between vertical height and terminal velocity of motions
down inclined planes. All these natural phenomena he saw
differently from the way they had been seen before.114

In explaining Galileo’s “discovery,” Kuhn points to those very
contingencies in perspective that Ingber finds so troubling:
Why did that shift of vision occur? Through Galileo’s individual
genius, of course. But note that genius does not here manifest itself
in more accurate or objective observation of the swinging body.
Descriptively, the Aristotelian perception is just as accurate. When
Galileo reported that the pendulum’s period was independent of
amplitude for amplitudes as great as 90°, his view of the pendulum
led him to see far more regularity than we can now discover there.
Rather, what seems to have been involved was the exploitation by

113

THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (3d ed.

114

Id. at 118-19 (footnote omitted).
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genius of perceptual possibilities made available by a medieval
paradigm shift. Galileo was not raised completely as an Aristotelian.
On the contrary, he was trained to analyze motions in terms of the
impetus theory, a late medieval paradigm which held that the
continuing motion of a heavy body is due to an internal power
implanted in it by the projector that initiated its motion.115

Galileo’s experience and training, as influenced by the
contemporary views of his society, caused him to adopt a new
scientific theory that replaced what had long been understood
to be truth.
Thus, even in science, a field that we conventionally
associate with objective truths, there are disagreements
engendered by what Ingber identified as “experience,
psychological propensities, and societal roles.” The result is one
that is disheartening for those who long for “objective truths”
that are invulnerable to debate. Kuhn explains:
To the extent, as significant as it is incomplete, that two scientific
schools disagree about what is a problem and what a solution, they
will inevitably talk through each other when debating the relative
merits of their respective paradigms. In the partially circular
arguments that regularly result, each paradigm will be shown to
satisfy more or less the criteria that it dictates for itself and to fall
short of a few of those dictated by its opponent.116

What Kuhn suggests in the passage is that any given scientific
discipline has already predetermined what sorts of “truth” it
seeks to find simply by defining the tests and methods that will
be employed. With this in mind, I need to revisit this statement
by Professor Ingber: “And if the possibility of rational discourse
and discovery is negated by these entrenched and
irreconcilable perceptions of truth, the dominant ‘truth’
discovered by the marketplace can result only from the
triumph of power, rather than the triumph of reason.”117 The
logic of scientific discovery described by Kuhn suggests that
“reason” does not (and cannot) exist outside the particular
scientific theory or paradigm which constitutes it, and that
there is no universal, overarching scientific theory that can
settle their disputes as a matter of principle.118

115
116
117
118

Id. at 119 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 109-10.
Ingber, supra note 3, at 15 (footnote omitted).
Kuhn explains:
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But surely we should not therefore condemn science as
ineffectual in helping us to arrive at better conclusions about
the truth. That is, we can sensibly argue that the justification
from truth should underwrite the legal right to scientific
discourse. Similarly, we should not condemn non-scientific
speakers in the marketplace of ideas because they also lack an
overarching objective truth waiting to be discovered. Recall the
Court’s application of the justification from truth to race-based
affirmative action in college admissions. Justice Powell, writing
a plurality opinion in Bakke, quoted from President William
Bowen of Princeton that the purpose of a college education is
not necessarily to find some ultimate truth but to be exposed to
the truths of others, which can challenge and enrich one’s
understanding.119 There is no expectation that students will
learn “objective” truths from engaging those who are different
from them. What is hoped is that students will “learn from
their differences” and “stimulate one another to reexamine
even their most deeply held assumptions about themselves and
their world.” It is quite unlikely that the students will, after
meeting or living with those who are different, arrive at the
same conclusions about cultural truths or arrive at conclusions
that others will necessarily regard as admirable. The
affirmative action policy, according to the Court, is meant
simply to provide for conditions where students are encouraged
to acquire information about others’ worldviews and to
deliberate about them, especially in relation to their own.

When paradigms enter, as they must, into a debate about paradigm choice,
their role is necessarily circular. Each group uses its own paradigm to argue
in that paradigm’s defense.
The resulting circularity does not, of course, make the arguments wrong or
even ineffectual. The man who premises a paradigm when arguing in its
defense can nonetheless provide a clear exhibit of what scientific practice will
be like for those who adopt the new view of nature. That exhibit can be
immensely persuasive, often compellingly so. Yet, whatever its force, the
status of the circular argument is only that of persuasion. It cannot be made
logically or even probabilistically compelling for those who refuse to step into
the circle. The premises and values shared by the two parties to a debate over
paradigms are not sufficiently extensive for that. As in political revolutions,
so in paradigm choice—there is no standard higher than the assent of the
relevant community.
KUHN, supra note 113, at 94.
119
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 313 (1978) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (quoting William Bowen, Admissions and the Relevance of Race,
PRINCETON ALUMNI WKLY. Sept. 26, 1977, at 9).
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A similar understanding of the justification from truth
informs other cases that I have discussed. In Whitney, Justice
Brandeis protected the public’s right to speech that was
subversive of the state, but he did not make it contingent on
the public being able to arrive at the objectively correct
conclusion
that
such
speech
was
dangerous
and
unpersuasive.120 Instead, he protected it because he believed
that deliberation by the public was a valuable end in itself. He
stated, “Those who won our independence believed that the
final end of the state was to make men free to develop their
faculties, and that in its government the deliberative forces
should prevail over the arbitrary.”121 Justice Brennan in New
York Times also did not stipulate that the public would
necessarily arrive at the objectively correct conclusion about
libel or politics or racism.122 All that he wanted was for the
public to deliberate seriously over a diversity of competing
viewpoints: “[P]ublic issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open, and . . . [public discourse] may well include
vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks
on government and public officials.”123 Similarly, in Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy, Justice Blackmun could not possibly
be sure that the consumers would arrive at some unequivocal
truth regarding whether brand name drugs were better than
cheaper generic substitutes.124 But, again, the point was not to
ensure that the public finds some objective truth but that they
make informed decisions borne of deliberation over an array of
competing advertisements. So Justice Blackmun explained, “It
is a matter of public interest that those decisions, in the
aggregate, be intelligent and well informed. To this end, the
free flow of commercial information is indispensable.”125 All that
the justification can be expected to do under such
circumstances is to generate a diversity of viewpoints and ideas
and to afford the audience the time and resources to deliberate
about them in a meaningful fashion. “Truths” about politics,
economic theory, and affirmative action are inherently
120
See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring), overruled in part by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444.
121
Id.
122
See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
123
Id. at 270; see also William J. Brennan, The Supreme Court and the
Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1, 15 (1965).
124
See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 765 (1976).
125
Id.
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contestable, but this conclusion should not cause us to cease
trying to argue about these things, as if, since there are no
unequivocal truths, it is useless to even deliberate about them.
Similarly for religion, we should explore competing and
alternative arguments even though the possibility of arriving
at a steady parade of objectively agreeable answers is quite
unlikely.
III.

THE MERITS OF A DIVERSITY OF VIEWPOINTS AND
IDEAS CONCERNING RELIGION

In urging the merits of a diversity of viewpoints and
ideas concerning religion, I want to sketch my arguments, for
reasons that I explain below, from the categories of religious
conversion and biblical exegesis.
A.

Skepticism and the Supernatural

The subject of conversion brings to the fore the merits of
how a diversity of viewpoints and ideas can help people to
arrive at better conclusions about the truth. For conversion is
the radical adoption of some new religious truth and the
complete abandonment of some other conception of truth.126 Is
such conversion more justified if based on deliberating over a
126

Lewis Rambo defines conversion as

change from the absence of a faith system . . . to another, or from one
orientation to another within a single faith system. It will mean a change of
one’s personal orientation toward life, from the haphazards of superstition to
the providence of a deity; from a reliance on rote and ritual to a deeper
conviction of God’s presence; from belief in a threatening, punitive,
judgmental deity to one that is loving, supportive, and desirous of the
maximum good. [Conversion also means] a spiritual transformation of life,
from seeing evil or illusion in everything connected with “this” world to
seeing all creation as a manifestation of God’s power and beneficence; from
denial of the self in this life in order to gain a holy thereafter; from seeking
personal gratification to a determination that the rule of God is what fulfills
human beings; from a life geared to one’s personal welfare above all else to a
concern for shared and equal justice for all. [Conversion means too] a radical
shifting of gears that can take the spiritually lackadaisical to a new level of
intensive concern, commitment, and involvement.
LEWIS R. RAMBO, UNDERSTANDING RELIGIOUS CONVERSION 2 (1993); see also Richard
Travisano, Alternation and Conversion as Qualitatively Different Transformations, in
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY THROUGH SYMBOLIC INTERACTION 594, 594 (Gregory P. Stone &
Harvey A. Farberman eds., 1970) (defining conversion as “a radical reorganization of
identity, meaning, life”); Max Heirch, Change of Heart: A Test of Some Widely Held
Theories about Religious Conversion, 83 AM. J. SOC. 653, 673-74 (Nov. 1977) (defining
conversion as “the process of changing a sense of root reality” and “a conscious shift in
one’s sense of grounding”).
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diversity of viewpoints and ideas or is it more justified if based
on dismissing those options? I want to argue for the former. In
Part III.A.1, I examine the case of a young Japanese student
and in Part III.A.2, that of the great Protestant leader Martin
Luther, as examples of radical religious conversions in which
the subject did not deliberate over a diversity of viewpoints.
Without denying the validity of the divine intervention as
recounted in these two conversion experiences, I suggest that a
deliberative approach might have provided for them more
justified conclusions.
1. From Divine Emperor to Holy Father
The most famous instance of conversion in the Bible is
that of Saul of Tarsus.127 Saul began as a relentless persecutor
of Christians but later converted to Christianity. In the Bible,
we are told that Saul never had to search for religious truth; it
came searching for him. Here follows the relevant biblical
passage:
Meanwhile, Saul was still breathing out murderous threats against
the Lord’s disciples. He went to the high priest and asked him for
letters to the synagogues in Damascus, so that if he found any there
who belonged to the Way, whether men or women, he might take
them as prisoners to Jerusalem. As he neared Damascus on his
journey, suddenly a light from heaven flashed around him. He fell to
the ground and heard a voice say to him, “Saul, Saul, why do you
persecute me?”
“Who are you, Lord?” Saul asked.
“I am Jesus, whom you are persecuting,” he replied. “Now get up
and go into the city, and you will be told what you must do.”128

When a light from heaven flashes around you and you
find yourself having a literal conversation with God, you
probably know that you are being treated to something special
by way of religious truth.129 So it is no surprise that Saul
converted instantly to Christianity.130 Later, Saul would
127

The Acts 9 (New International Version).
Id. at 1-6.
129
This type of experience, where a person suddenly converts to a faith
because of some divine intervention, is sometimes called a “Damascus Road”
conversion. John Lofland & Norman Skonovd, Conversion Motifs, 20 J. SCI. STUD.
RELIGION 373, 377 (1981).
130
The Bible tells us:
128

Saul spent several days with the disciples in Damascus. At once he began to
preach in the synagogues that Jesus is the Son of God. All those who heard

2007]

DELIBERATING THE DIVINE

35

consummate the conversion process by rejecting his identity as
Saul of Tarsus (the enemy of Christ) and becoming Paul the
Apostle (the servant of Christ).131 John Lofland and Norman
Skonovd call this “mystical” conversion and, in their view, it
“has in a sense functioned as the ideal of what conversion
should be in the Western world.”132
Yet ideal and practice are not the same thing: If you are
like me—and I suspect that you probably are—you have not
been blessed with dazzling heavenly lights and you have not
found yourself having a conversation with God, where God
talks back in coherent full sentences, gives traveling
instructions, and tells you that he will get back to you later.133
By saying this, I do not mean to offer myself as validation for
the snide skepticism that has figured in what one prominent
law professor has rebuked as the “culture of disbelief.”134 My
statement is instead meant to suggest that our faiths are often
mediated by books, sermons, culture, conversations (with other
human beings, not God), and other ordinary earthly
experiences. Therefore, unlike Paul, we will probably never be
absolutely sure that we are in possession of some immaculate
divine truth. This is why I believe that deliberation over
diverse viewpoints and ideas is crucial, or at least very useful,
for helping people to ascertain whether their religious beliefs
are rooted in truth or whether they are principally the products
of their culture, their parents, their psychological conditions, or
some other non-religious source.
Here, it is worth considering Mill’s observation about
the provisional nature of beliefs. Many claims, Mill declares,
have been subject to revision and rejection, and “other ages,
countries, sects, churches, classes, and parties have thought,
him were astonished and asked, “Isn’t he the man who raised havoc in
Jerusalem among those who call on this name? And hasn’t he come here to
take them as prisoners to the chief priests?” Yet Saul grew more and more
powerful and baffled the Jews living in Damascus by proving that Jesus is
the Christ.
The Acts 9:19-22 (New International Version) (footnotes omitted).
131
RAMBO, supra note 126, at 145.
132
Lofland & Skonovd, supra note 129, at 377; see also RAMBO, supra note
126, at 145 (“Many scholars consider Paul’s conversion to be the paradigm of the
sudden conversion in Christianity.”).
133
Lewis Rambo writes after an extensive study of conversion that “[f]or most
people, conversion is not so dramatic or intense [as for Saul].” RAMBO, supra note 126,
at 145.
134
STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: HOW AMERICAN LAW AND
POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 3 (1993).
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and even now think, the exact reverse” of what Mill’s
nineteenth century Englishmen accepted as the truth.135 Mill
continues that “it never troubles [the ostensibly infallible] that
mere accident has decided which of these numerous worlds is
the object of his reliance, and that the same causes which make
him a Churchman in London, would have made him a Buddhist
or a Confucian in Pekin [sic].”136 According to this view, the
claim of infallibility cannot be sustained given that much of our
knowledge is the product of historical and cultural contingency.
This is not to suggest that all answers are necessarily equally
bad (or good), but that no one should consider personal views to
be presumptively entitled to a claim of infallibility.
Consider this example. There are no identifying names
and no source is cited as reference in the passage that follows,
but I think the example will suffice for my purposes. Walter
Farrell, a Catholic priest, relates the story of a non-Christian
Japanese man who came to realize soon after World War II
that his belief in the divinity of the Japanese Emperor was
false and that Christianity was the only religious truth:
In a recent issue of one of our national magazines there is an
interesting account of a young Japanese student’s experiences
during World War II. He was in his second year at Tokyo University
when war broke out and “swept along on the surging wave of
patriotism, (he) enlisted in the Submarine Corps of the Japanese
Imperial Navy.” . . .
“At this time,” the young man writes, “I believed with all my heart in
the divinity of the Emperor. To die for him was the supreme glory of
the Japanese fighting man. To sacrifice one’s life in the Imperial
service was undoubted assurance of an eternal reward.”137

But the young man’s chance to die for the Emperor never
arrived. Japan surrendered to the United States, and the
young man surrendered to Christianity:
A short time after we stood and listened to the Emperor declare over
the radio in his own voice that he was not divine. This denial of his
heavenly origin and attributes was almost more than I could bear.
Lost in my thoughts, I wandered through the debris. My most
frightening nightmares were nothing compared with the crushing
loneliness and fear that I felt in my heart.

135

MILL, supra note 27, at 21.
Id.
137
Walter Farrell, Introduction to VINCENT V. HERR, RELIGIOUS PSYCHOLOGY
13-14 (1966).
136
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I don’t know how long I wandered aimlessly through the streets. My
first moment of awareness came when I heard the laughter of a
group of children who were leaving the remains of a bombed-out
building. The knowledge that anyone could laugh happily in such
circumstances piqued my curiosity. After much hesitation, I
approached the ruined building and entered.
The first words I heard were, “Jesus Christ, true God and true man,
loved us before we came to be, and died for each one of us that we
may save our souls.”
At the sight of Christ on the cross, my empty heart was filled and I
was overwhelmed by what I now know to be the power of grace. In
that moment of discovery, I felt the reality of Christ and His love.138

The account here broadly parallels Paul’s conversion on the
Damascus Road in that the Japanese student’s experience was
also rather instantaneous and, hence, suggestive of the
miraculous in its revelations.
But there are differences, too. Whereas we are told that
Paul was able to receive his religious truth through the
unmediated voice of God and accompanied by a portentous
spectacle of heavenly lights, the young Japanese man’s
acquisition of truth might have been less straightforward. After
all, the latter never heard the voice of God or saw heavenly
lights. All that was offered to him was the laughter of children,
another human being’s declaration that Christ was the Lord,
and some kind of artistic representation of Jesus on the cross.
None of these things, without considerable embellishment, is
divine or supernatural.139 Therefore, how did the young man
know that his sudden turn to Christianity was not a reaction to
non-religious stimuli? As Lewis Rambo has suggested in his
extensive study of conversion, motives for conversion “are not
simple and single.”140 Instead, he explains:
Context is the integration of both the superstructure and the
infrastructure of conversion, and it includes social, cultural,
religious, and personal dimensions. Contextual factors shape
avenues of communication, the range of religious options available,
and people’s mobility, flexibility, resources, and opportunities. These
factors have a direct impact on who converts and how conversion
138

Id. at 14.
While a concept of religion need not require that a person experience
something supernatural, the concept would seem to presuppose the existence of the
supernatural at the core of any religion. See WARD, supra note 104, at 21 (“Religions
can differ greatly from one another, but a central, if not absolutely universal, theme is
the existence of a supernatural realm in relation to which some form of human
fulfillment can be found.”).
140
RAMBO, supra note 126, at 140.
139
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happens. People can often be induced, encouraged, prevented, or
forced to either accept or reject conversion on the basis of factors
external to the individual.141

Let us examine these different factors, or to employ Professor
Page’s terminology from Part II, perspectives, in the context of
the Japanese student’s conversion.142 Is it possible that
stunning political changes, rather than Jesus, may have caused
the young man to believe that Christianity was the truth?
There is at least a plausible case to be made. First, the young
man’s conversion experience differs from that of Paul’s because
the former never experienced anything like the supernatural
intervention that caused the latter’s conversion. True, the
catastrophe of war is no prosaic event, but it is not
supernatural like heavenly lights and the voice of God. And
then there is the matter of the Japanese student’s horrific
realization that his Emperor was merely a political prop meant
to reinforce an ideology of patriotism. The young man saw
around him further evidence of Japan’s failures in the random
debris and bombed-out buildings, testaments to American
domination. Emperor worship had been literally discredited by
a country whose emblematic religion is Christianity. It was an
apt situation for Professor Rambo’s observation that “[d]uring a
severe crisis, the deficiencies of a culture become obvious to
many people, thus stimulating interest in new alternatives.”143
And specifically, “the perceived strength of a colonial power is a
crucial variable.”144 These circumstances raise questions about
the young man’s conclusion that Christianity is the religious
truth: Was it influenced unduly by the literal collapse of the
Japanese nation and the perceived dominance of the United
States? We do not know for sure, but it would seem desirable
for the Japanese convert to have considered these other factors
so that he may have arrived at a more accurate conclusion
about his new found truth, just as it is desirable in the
interests of finding religious truth that he have had access to a
greater diversity of viewpoints before he accepted the belief
that the Japanese Emperor was God incarnate.145
141

Id. at 20-21.
Rambo divides the factors into those that derive from “macrocontext” or
“microcontext.” Id. at 20-22. For me, the categories seem too interdependent and
porous, and I thus avoid introducing them.
143
Id. at 41.
144
Id.
145
One thing that comes to my mind with regard to the Japanese student’s
conversion is religion’s power of consolation, especially after traumatic events like war.
142
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There are other perspectives concerning religion that
are external to religion itself but which can potentially help a
person to assess the legitimacy of her prospective religious
beliefs. For example, did the young man consider the
perspective that his family, not his epiphany, is principally
responsible for his religious disposition?146 The founder of
psychoanalysis, Sigmund Freud, posits in his The Future of an
Illusion that those individuals inclined toward religions like
Christianity and Emperor-worship are less interested in the
religion per se than in a desire for a strong father figure who
can lay to rest the individual’s relentless anxiety about the
uncertainty of life.147 Freud begins his argument in the
following manner.148 He first describes man’s perception of
nature as the antithesis of order and safety as represented by
civilization.149 For nature in Freud’s view symbolizes a world
where death is inevitable and the promise of an afterlife is
altogether uncertain; it is also a world ruled by forms of
suffering that are absent moral meaning and distributed
arbitrarily.150 In their attempt to comprehend these powerful
and mysterious forces, people seek the “humanization of
The philosopher of science Richard Dawkins argues that this power causes many
people to believe illogically that God in fact exists. He writes:
It is time to face up to the important role that God plays in consoling us; and
the humanitarian challenge, if he does not exist, to put something in his
place. Many people who concede that God probably doesn’t exist, and that he
is not necessary for morality, still come back with what they often regard as a
trump card: the alleged psychological or emotional need for a god.
....
The first thing to say in response to this is something that should need no
saying. Religion’s power to console doesn’t make it true. Even if we make a
huge concession; even if it were conclusively demonstrated that belief in
God’s existence is completely essential to human psychological and emotional
well-being; even if all atheists were despairing neurotics driven to suicide by
relentless cosmic angst—none of this would contribute the tiniest jot or tittle
of evidence that religious belief is true. It might be evidence in favour of the
desirability of convincing yourself that God exists, even if he doesn’t.
RICHARD DAWKINS, THE GOD DELUSION 352 (2006).
146
The Yale psychologist Joel Allison has suggested that “sudden and
dramatic conversion” within a male divinity student might be attributable to the
student’s desire to substitute a weak father for a divine one that can offer firm
judgment and guidance. Joel Allison, Religious Conversion: Regression and Progression
in an Adolescent Experience, 8 J. SCI. STUD. RELIGION 23, 24, 28, 30, 32 (1969).
147
SIGMUND FREUD, THE FUTURE OF AN ILLUSION (James Strachey ed., W.D.
Robson-Scott trans., Anchor Books 1964).
148
Id. at 22.
149
Id.
150
Id. at 20-21.
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nature.”151 As helpless children, Freud argues, people identify
their fathers as the embodiment of nature in its scariest forms;
at the same time, the father comes to represent a protection
against the unknown.152 This same anthropomorphism was
evident in a person’s understanding of God. Freud elaborates
this view:
In the function [of protection] the mother is soon replaced by the
stronger father, who retains that position for the rest of childhood.
But the child’s attitude to its father is colored by a peculiar
ambivalence. The father himself constitutes a danger for the child,
perhaps because of its earlier relation to its mother. Thus it fears
him no less than it longs for him and admires him. The indications of
this ambivalence in the attitude to the father are deeply imprinted
in every religion . . . . When the growing individual finds that he is
destined to remain a child forever, that he can never do without
protection against strange superior powers, he lends those powers
the features of belonging to the figure of his father; he creates for
himself the gods whom he dreads, whom he seeks to propitiate, and
whom he nevertheless entrusts with his own protection. Thus his
longing for a father is a motive identical with his need for protection
against the consequences of his human weakness. The defense
against childish helplessness is what lends its characteristic features
to the adult’s reaction to the helplessness which he has to

151
152

FREUD, supra note 147, at 22.
Freud explained:

Impersonal forces and destinies cannot be approached; they remain eternally
remote. But if the elements have passions that rage as they do in our own
souls, if death itself is not something spontaneous but the violent act of an
evil Will, if everywhere in nature there are Beings around us of a kind that
we know in our own society, then we can breathe freely, can feel at home in
the uncanny and can deal by psychical means with our senseless anxiety. We
are still defenseless, perhaps, but we are no longer helplessly paralyzed; we
can at least react. Perhaps, indeed, we are not even defenseless. We can
apply the same methods against these violent supermen outside that we
employ in our own society; we can try to adjure them, to appease them, to
bribe them, and, by so influencing them, we may rob them of a part of their
power. A replacement like this of natural science by psychology not only
provides immediate relief, but also points the way to a further mastering of
the situation.
For this situation is nothing new. It has an infantile prototype, of which it is
in fact only the continuation. For once before one has found oneself in a
similar state of helplessness: as a small child, in relation to one’s parents.
One had reason to fear them, and especially one’s father; and yet one was
sure of his protection against the dangers one knew. Thus it was natural to
assimilate the two situations . . . . [A] man makes the forces of nature not
simply into persons with whom he can associate as he would with his
equals—that would not do justice to the overpowering impression which
those forces make on him—but he gives them the character of a father.
Id. at 24.
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acknowledge—a reaction which is precisely the formation of
religion . . . .153
....
As we already know, the terrifying impression of helplessness in
childhood aroused the need for protection—for protection through
love—which was provided by the father; and the recognition that
this helplessness lasts throughout life made it necessary to cling to
the existence of a father, but this time a more powerful one. Thus the
benevolent rule of a divine Providence allays our fear of the dangers
of life; the establishment of a moral world-order ensures the
fulfillment of the demands of justice, which have so often remained
unfulfilled in human civilization; and the prolongation of earthly
existence in a future life provides the local and temporal framework
in which these wish-fulfillments shall take place. Answers to the
riddles that tempt the curiosity of man, such as how the universe
began or what the relation is between body and mind, are developed
in conformity with the underlying assumptions of this system. It is
an enormous relief to the individual psyche if the conflicts of its
childhood arising from the father complex—conflicts which it has
never wholly overcome—are removed from it and brought to a
solution which is universally accepted.154

In this way, God serves as a means to resolve an individual’s
most intimate familial crises.
Perhaps it is unrealistic to expect the young Japanese
man in our example to have read Freud. But it would seem
useful if the young man had considered something like the
Freudian perspective, especially given the former’s unswerving
dedication to the supreme patriarchal figure of his Japanese
Emperor-God and then his equally unswerving and stunningly
abrupt dedication to another supreme patriarchal figure, the
Christian Holy Father. And if we may add perspectives, as
Professor Page does in his examples involving mathematical
sequences, is it possible that the perspective derived from the
trauma of war compounded the perspective derived from one’s
desire for an omnipotent father figure? Freud, after all,
describes an existence that, without the psychological
consolations of an invented divine father, would lead many to
trudge along in lives that failed to offer redemptive meaning
for their endless sufferings. According to the Freudian account,
the Japanese Emperor Father gave the young man a purpose
for and meaning to his military sacrifice during the severe
uncertainties of war, while the Christian Holy Father supplied

153
154

Id. at 35.
Id. at 47-48.

42

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:1

a purpose for and meaning to the devastation and terror that
he had experienced at the hands of the Americans.
The absolute obedience that the young man exercised
toward these two divinely powerful patriarchal figures would
seem to recall the intriguing remarks of Freud’s fellow
psychoanalyst Erich Fromm. Whereas Freud’s Future of an
Illusion did not deal explicitly with political issues, Fromm’s
Psychoanalysis and Religion does.155 Fromm invokes a political
reference to the Fuhrer-worshipping fascism of World War II
Germany, an example that should call to mind the Emperorworshipping fascism that organized the nation of the young
Japanese man. Fromm explains that, like fascism,
“authoritarian religions” require that the individual surrender
power to some “transcending man.”156 In surrendering, a person
relinquishes his independence and integrity as an individual
but acquires a sense of being protected by some supernatural
power of which he has, in a sense, become a part.157
Authoritarian religion is thus not unlike authoritarian political
regimes such as the one commanded by the fascist Emperor to
whom our Japanese student had initially pledged his utter
obedience: “Here the Fuhrer or the beloved ‘Father of His
People’ or the State or the Race or the Socialist Fatherland
becomes the object of worship; the life of the individual
becomes insignificant and man’s worth consists in the very
denial of his worth and strength.”158
By saying this, Fromm does not mean in any way to
condemn Christianity,159 but means rather to shed light on a
particular kind of psychological disposition. Given the young
Japanese student’s swift shift in obsession from one divine
155

See generally ERICH FROMM, PSYCHOANALYSIS AND RELIGION (Yale Univ.
Press 1950).
156
Id. at 35.
157
Id.
158
Id. at 36.
159
Unlike Freud, Fromm believes that religion could have ameliorative moral
effects on both the individual and society. For example, Fromm praises the ethos of
early Christianity:
That early Christianity is humanistic and not authoritarian is evident from
the spirit and text of all Jesus’ teachings. Jesus’ precept that “the kingdom of
God is within you” is the simple and clear expression of nonauthoritarian
thinking. But only a few hundred years later, after Christianity had ceased to
be the religion of the poor and humble peasants, artisans, and slaves . . . and
had become the religion of those ruling the Roman Empire, the authoritarian
trend in Christianity became dominant.
Id. at 48.
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father figure to another, it would have been useful for him, in
the interests of truth, if the young man had deliberated about
Freud’s and Fromm’s psychological perspectives, as there is no
indication in the quoted passage that he did.160
2. From Repressive Father to Holy Father
Even the conversion experiences of the most famous of
religious figures can be described in psychoanalytic terms in a
way that questions whether they have found religious truth.
Erik Erikson’s classic study of Martin Luther is a good
example.161 Luther would eventually become the founder of
Lutheran Protestantism, but as a young man he had resigned
himself to the insistent expectations of his coal miner father,
Hans, who longed for his talented son to gain entrance into the
profitable and respectable world of lawyers and their
professional class.162 But something would change all that. One
night, so the official story goes, a “bolt of lightning struck the
ground near him, perhaps threw him to the ground, and caused
him to be seized by a severe, some say convulsive, state of
terror.”163 Luther felt as if he was “completely walled in by the
painful fear of a sudden death” and before he knew it, “he had
called out, ‘Help me, St. Anne . . . . I want to become a monk.’”164
And so he did: “On his return . . . he told his friends that he felt
committed to enter a monastery. He did not inform his
father.”165
Luther’s rejection of his father’s authority was not quite
complete, however, for the young man continued to live in
dread of his father’s power and authority. Hans was a
160
In making these suggestions, I do not mean to suggest that religious beliefs
necessarily harbor some psychological malady. Instead, I am inclined to agree with the
conclusions of psychologist Gordon Allport:

Many personalities attain a religious view of life without suffering arrested
development and without self-deception. Indeed it is by virtue of their
religious outlook upon life—expanding as experience expands—that they are
able to build and maintain a mature and well-integrated edifice of
personality. The conclusions they reach and the sentiments they hold are
various, as unique as is personality itself.
ALLPORT, supra note 108, at viii.
161
See ERIK H. ERIKSON, YOUNG MAN LUTHER: A STUDY IN PSYCHOANALYSIS
AND HISTORY (Norton 1958).
162
Id. at 50, 56.
163
Id. at 91.
164
Id. at 91-92.
165
Id. at 92.
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vindictive and harsh father who routinely threatened and
bullied his son Martin. Worse, Hans rationalized his abuse as
the moral righteousness of an upright judge of character.166
After a lifetime of intimidation, Martin believed that he could
not resist his father without emasculating him; on the other
hand, Martin did not believe that he could obey his father
without emasculating himself.167 He was stuck in a terrible
paradox.168
Erikson proposes that Martin was able to resolve this
dilemma by turning to what he perceived as a higher father—a
Holy Father—to whom the young man had to submit as a
matter of authority. The evidence on offer begins with the
recognition that Martin’s conversion, like that of the Japanese
student, was impelled by a set of nonsupernatural events, not
the divine intervention that defined Paul’s experience on the
Damascus Road. First, Christ himself had spoken to Paul and
others had witnessed it.169 But Martin never had any witnesses
and he never claimed to have seen or heard anything
supernatural.170 Professor Erikson writes,
We must say, therefore, that while Paul’s experience must remain in
the twilight of biblical psychology, Martin can claim for his
conversion only ordinary psychology attributes, except for his
professed conviction that it was God who had directed an otherwise
ordinary thunderstorm straight toward him.171

Notwithstanding these pedestrian renderings of
Luther’s religious experience, the storm and the lightning, from
a psychoanalytic perspective, were useful symbolic resources to
resolve the problems with his father:
There remains one motive which God and Martin shared at this
time: the need for God to match Hans, within Martin, so that Martin
would be able to disobey Hans and shift the whole matter of
obedience and disavowal to a higher, and historically significant,
plane. It was necessary that an experience occur which would
convincingly qualify as being both exterior and superior, so that

166

ERIKSON, supra note 161, at 92.
Id. at 67.
168
Id.
169
Id. at 93.
170
Id. at 92.
171
Id. at 94. Erikson qualifies that he does not mean to reduce Martin’s beliefs
to mere psychology: “We are not in the least emphasizing the purely psychological
character of the matter in order to belittle it: Martin’s limited claims, coupled with a
conviction which he carried to the bitter end, show him to be an honest member of a
different era.” Id.
167
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either Hans would feel compelled to let his son go (and that,
remember, he never could and never would do) or that the son would
be able to forswear the father and fatherhood. For the final vow
would imply both that Martin was another Father’s servant, and
that he would never become the father of Hans’ grandsons.
Ordination would bestow on the son the ceremonial functions of a
spiritual father, a guardian of souls and a guide to eternity, and
relegate the natural father to a merely physical and legal status.172

Again, as in my discussion of the Japanese student, I cannot
say with certainty that Luther’s religious conversion is without
justification. My aim is rather to invite consideration of an
alternative perspective in psychoanalysis in order to enrich our
deliberative possibilities for arriving at the truth of some
religious belief.173
In the next section, I sketch examples of people who
deliberated about different religious perspectives in order to
arrive at a more justifiable conclusion about truth.
B.

Deliberation Over a Diversity of Viewpoints and Ideas

I want to sketch in this section two perspectives on the
uses of deliberation for purposes of discovering religious truth.
One is by the Protestant philosopher John Milton in his
Areopagitica, a pamphlet he wrote in 1644 to challenge
Parliament’s censorship against certain religious books. What
makes Milton’s argument intriguing for my purposes is that it
is derived from a perspective that is itself religious. On the
other hand, the second figure to whom I turn is Thomas
Jefferson, a man whose skepticism about religion could never
be confused with Milton’s religious zeal. I discuss Jefferson’s
letter to his nephew in which the former president outlines his
arguments for the sort of deliberation that I am commending.
By offering the arguments of the faithful Milton and the
skeptical Jefferson, it is my hope that the reader will gain a
fuller sense of the merits of deliberation for the discovery of
truths pertaining to religion.

172
Id. at 94-95. For a similar conclusion regarding the conversion experiences
of some contemporary theology students, see Allison, supra note 146.
173
I do not, therefore, agree with Freud’s adamant declaration that it would
be an illusion “to suppose that what science cannot give us we can get elsewhere.”
FREUD, supra note 147, at 92. I am inclined to sympathize with Erikson’s more modest
understanding of the relationship between psychoanalysis and religion. ERIKSON,
supra note 161, at 21 (arguing that psychoanalysis and religion pursue different
objectives and that neither one need not logically take priority over the other).
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1. A Perspective of the Faithful: The Case of
John Milton
I began this Article with a discussion of Justices Holmes
and Brandeis as the forerunners of the justification from truth
within the American judicial context. Yet while both justices
restricted their discussion to secular speech, the most famous
argument in Western culture for what contemporaries style the
justification from truth was offered by the deeply religious
John Milton, who sought to employ the justification to support
religious, not secular, speech.174 Furthermore, unlike Holmes
and Brandeis, Milton’s version of the justification from truth is
underwritten almost entirely by religious arguments.175
Professor Vincent Blasi has therefore wisely cautioned
contemporaries against conscripting Areopagitica, Milton’s
famous defense of religious speech, as a straightforward
defense of expression generally.176 Consider what is surely the
most widely cited quotation from Areopagitica. Milton declares
with an optimism seemingly bordering on the naïve: “Let
[Truth] and Falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the
worse, in a free and open encounter.”177 As anyone today knows,
however, there is no guarantee that truth will win in a battle
with falsehood. Therefore, to make serviceable Milton’s oftquoted line, it is useful to consult the context. Milton is
confident that truth will prevail over falsehood because God is
on the side of truth. Milton’s declaration is less a prediction
about psychology than a faith in divine providence. He “knows”
that truth will prevail because God wills that it should.178
174

JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA 6 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1918) (1644).
See Vincent Blasi, Milton’s Areopagitica and the Modern First
Amendment, Ralph Gregory Elliot First Amendment Lecture (Mar. 1995), available at
http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/Milton.pdf.
176
Id.; see also Francis Canavan, John Milton and Freedom of Expression, 7
INTERPRETATION 50 (1978).
177
MILTON, supra note 174, at 58.
178
Milton writes: “For who knows not that Truth is strong next to the
Almighty; she needs no policies, no stratagems, nor licencings to make her
victorious . . . .” Id. at 59. He also elaborates:
175

For when God shakes a Kingdome with strong and healthful commotions to a
general reforming, ‘tis not untrue that many sectaries and false teachers are
then busiest in seducing; but yet more true it is, that God then raises to his
own work men of rare abilities, and more then common industry not only to
look back and revise what hath bin taught heretofore, but to gain further and
go on, some new enlightened steps in the discovery of truth. For such is the
order of God’s enlightening his Church, to dispense and deal out by degrees
his beam, so as our earthly eyes may best sustain it.
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But if Milton is confident in the broad outlines of God’s
plans, he nonetheless urges humans themselves to do their
part and deliberate over religious truth. For “God uses not to
captivate [a man] under a perpetual childhood of prescription,
but trusts him with the gift of reason to be his own
chooser . . . .”179 And being one’s own chooser involves having to
choose in a world where good and evil are mutually
constitutive.180
In fact, according to Milton, man’s knowledge of good
begins with his knowledge of evil. He explains that Adam ate
the forbidden fruit and thus at once acquired knowledge of both
good and evil, and it was only by knowing evil that he came to
know good, and vice versa.181 Instead of dodging the spectacles
of evil, then, a dutiful Christian must vigorously seek them out
so as to refine his conception of that which is divine and good:
He that can apprehend and consider vice with all her baits and
seeming pleasures, and yet abstain, and yet distinguish, and yet
prefer that which is truly better, he is the true wayfaring Christian.
I cannot praise a fugitive and cloistered virtue, unexercised and
unbreathed, where that immortal garland is to be run for, not
without dust and heat.182

Here, Milton’s rhetoric of virtue, while situated squarely in
religious discourse, resonates with the language of Justice
Brandeis in Whitney, because both men identify as a threat to
the discovery of truth a passive audience that is indifferent to
the obligations of deliberation, whether those obligations derive
Id. at 61-62. When necessary, I have for clarity’s sake silently modernized Milton’s
spelling and grammar.
179
Id. at 19.
180
Milton writes:
Good and evil we know in the field of this World grow up together almost
inseparably; and the knowledge of good is so involved and interwoven with
the knowledge of evil, and in so many cunning resemblances hardly to be
discerned, that those confused seeds which were imposed on Psyche as an
incessant labor to cull out, and sort asunder, were not intermixed.
Id. at 19-20.
181

Milton explains:

It was from out of the rind of one apple tasted, that the knowledge of good
and evil as two twins cleaving together leapt forth into the World. And
perhaps that is that doom which Adam of knowing good and evil, that is to
say of knowing good by evil. As therefore the state of man now is; what
wisdom can there be to choose, what continence to forbear without the
knowledge of evil?
Id. at 20.
182

Id.
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from religion, as they did for Milton, or, in Brandeis’s case,
from the civic requirements of democracy. And in the following
passage, Milton sounds like the nineteenth century pragmatist
Mill, who argued that even false ideas can help the audience to
refine and confirm its assumption of truth:
Since therefore the knowledge and survey of vice is in this world so
necessary to the constituting of human virtue, and the scanning of
error to the confirmation of truth, how can we more safely, and with
less danger scout into the regions of sin and falsity than by reading
all manner of tracts, and hearing all manner of reason? And this is
the benefit which may be had of books promiscuously read.183

Notwithstanding (or, I suppose, because of) Milton’s
staunch faith in Christianity, the above passage is impressive
in its open-mindedness. It goes beyond his earlier argument
that good is mutually constitutive of evil. Here, Milton
broadens his purview of the acceptable by urging his readers to
reflect on “all manner of tracts” and “all manner of reason” and
to raid a “promiscuous” stock of books. In this way, as much as
Milton abhorred what he perceived as the intolerance of the
Catholics of his day,184 his disposition bears a resemblance to
that of the Catholic Church. The Catholic Church provides
another example of the benefit of the deliberative approach to
religious truth: the use of the devil’s advocate. Consider once
again Mill’s defense of a diversity of viewpoints and ideas.
While generally considered to be the bastion of secular
enlightenment, Mill’s On Liberty contains the telling example
of the Catholic Church’s use of the devil’s advocate, an example
that is all the more interesting because of Mill’s jaundiced
reference to the Catholic Church as the “most intolerant of
churches”:185
The most intolerant of churches, the Roman Catholic Church, even
at the canonization of a saint, admits, and listens patiently to, a
“devil’s advocate.” The holiest of men, it appears, cannot be admitted

183

MILTON, supra note 174, at 21.
Despite his tolerance for religious diversity, Milton refused to tolerate
Catholics for he felt that they refused to tolerate anyone else: “I mean not tolerated
Popery, and open superstition, which as it extirpates all religions and civil
supremacies, so itself should be extirpated, provided first that all charitable and
compassionate means be used to win and regain the weak and the misled . . . .” Id. at
60.
185
MILL, supra note 27, at 24.
184
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to posthumous honours, until all that the devil could say against him
is known and weighed.186

This passage can be read for the proposition that even if a
priest feels himself called by God to advocate a nominee for
sainthood, both the priest-advocate and those priests in the
audience can benefit from deliberation over different
viewpoints. Indeed, the original name of the “devil’s advocate”
was the “general promoter of the faith,” for it was the devil’s
advocate who urged Catholics to carefully deliberate about
whether a candidate for sainthood was worthy of their religious
faith.187
I have conscripted Milton’s ideas as well as the devil’s
advocate of the Catholic Church to show that even religionists
can benefit enormously from a deliberative approach to
religious truth. In the next section, I offer an example from a
secular perspective, that of Thomas Jefferson.

186
187

Id.
4 New Catholic Encyclopedia 705 (2d. ed. 2003).

The Promoter of the Faith was entrusted with opposing the claims of the
patrons of the cause and those of the “saint’s advocate,” thereby earning for
himself the easily misunderstood title of “devil’s” advocate. In actual fact, he
was rather the advocate of the Church, which must be extremely severe in
the investigation directed to establish whether or not a baptized person is
truly qualified to be beatified or canonized. Statistical data on such causes
clearly show that several processes, apparently very promising at the
beginning, had to be abandoned later because of difficulties, raised by the
promoter of the faith, that could not be satisfactorily answered. In these
cases, the critical and seemingly negative work of the promoter of the faith
undoubtedly had a great positive value, inasmuch as it prevented the Church
from pronouncing a certain and favorable judgment on the life and works of a
person without possessing unquestionable proof. The function of the promoter
of the faith proved itself most useful in the processes that were successfully
concluded. Not only did he guarantee that the proceedings were conducted
according to law, but the objections raised by him . . . compelled the patrons
of the cause to perform an ever more profound and complete examination of
the person in question.
Id. at 705-06. Especially interesting is how the Catholic Church, like Milton, views
deliberation as logically conducive to discovering the divine:
Consequently, [the promoter of the faith’s] activity contributed to the effort of
presenting the servant of God in his true image, so that the faith may come to
know the Christian richness of his soul and look on him as a person selected
by God for the Church and worthy of beatification and canonization.
Id. at 706.
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2. Skepticism Toward Religion: The Case of
Thomas Jefferson
A diversity of perspectives concerning the nature of
religion can help people to arrive at more justifiable
conclusions about religious truth. While he is generally
remembered as the President of the United States, Thomas
Jefferson was a thoughtful student of religion, and his
arguments deserve to be considered because he illustrates how
a diversity of viewpoints can be used to analyze the integrity of
a faith from a perspective outside the religious canon. During
his presidency, Jefferson was condemned by some religionists
as a stubborn atheist,188 but he took religious faith quite
seriously and insisted that people’s religious choices should be
respected, especially if they were the product of careful
deliberation over competing viewpoints, including competing
viewpoints that were grounded in those modes of logic and
deduction characteristic of secular enlightenment inquiry. A
sustained explanation of his position is found in his letter to
Peter Carr, his nephew. Jefferson writes to him:
Your reason is now mature enough to examine this object [of
religion]. In the first place, divest yourself of all bias in favor of
novelty and singularity of opinion. Indulge them in any other subject
rather than that of religion. It is too important, and the
consequences of error may be too serious. On the other hand, shake
off all the fears and servile prejudices, under which weak minds are
servilely crouched. Fix reason firmly in her seat, and call to her
tribunal every fact, every opinion. Question with boldness even the
existence of a God; because, if there be one, he must more approve of
the homage of reason, than that of blindfolded fear.189

Striking in the passage is its employment of those tropes that
structured Justice Brandeis’s Whitney concurrence: reason,
fear and courage.190 Like Brandeis, Jefferson contrasts reason,
which does not come naturally but must be propelled by
courage, against prejudice, which is a byproduct of fear.
Reason, as Jefferson conceives it, resembles Brandeis’s
188
So write Adrienne Koch and William Peden: “The financial bigwigs of New
York and New England still feared and opposed [Jefferson]; nor had reactionary and
orthodox churchmen completely abandoned their habit of tongue-lashing the ‘Atheist.’ ”
Adrienne Koch & William Peden, Introduction to THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON xxxv (Adrienne Koch & William Peden eds., Random House 1993)
(1944) [hereinafter THE LIFE].
189
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Peter Carr (Aug. 10, 1787), in id. at 399.
190
See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927), overruled in part by
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444; see also Blasi, supra note 35.
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conception in that it is meant to evoke a posture of critical
inquiry, not necessarily a deeper philosophical commitment
that rejects religion or considers reason incompatible with
religion. Indeed, the lens of reason could, according to
Jefferson, theoretically steer its possessor to admit the
existence of God.191
We are afforded an example of the importance Jefferson
placed on deliberation in his discussion of the book of Joshua in
the Christian Bible. He admonishes Carr:
But those facts in the Bible which contradict the laws of nature,
must be examined with more care, and under a variety of faces. Here
you must recur to the pretensions of the writer to inspiration from
God. Examine upon what evidence his pretensions are founded, and
whether that evidence is so strong, as that its falsehood would be
more improbable than a change in the laws of nature, in the case he
relates. For example, in the book of Joshua, we are told, the sun
stood still several hours. Were we to read that fact in Livy or
Tacitus, we should class it with their showers of blood, speaking of
statues, beasts, etc. But it is said, that the writer of that book was
inspired. Examine, therefore, candidly, what evidence there is of his
having been inspired.192

Although the trajectory of his discussion appears to discount
the veracity of the biblical miracles, Jefferson ultimately
remains agnostic, accepting his own advice to Carr to “divest
yourself of all bias in favor of novelty and singularity of
opinion.”193 So he tells Carr that the account of the sun standing
still for several hours is “entitled to your inquiry, because
millions believe it.”194 “On the other hand,” Jefferson qualifies,
you are astronomer enough to know how contrary it is to the law of
nature that a body revolving on its axis, as the earth does, should
have stopped, should not, by that sudden stoppage, have prostrated
animals, trees, buildings, and should after a certain time have

191

Jefferson writes:

Do not be frightened from this inquiry by any fear of its consequences. If it
ends in a belief that there is no God, you will find incitements to virtue in the
comfort and pleasantness you feel in its exercise, and the love of others which
it will procure you. If you find reason to believe there is a God, a
consciousness that you are acting under his eye, and that he approves you,
will be a vast additional incitement . . . . If that Jesus was also a God, you
will be comforted by a belief of his aid and love.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Peter Carr (Aug. 10, 1787), in THE LIFE, supra note
188, at 397, 400.
192
Id. at 399.
193
Id.
194
Id.
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resumed its revolution, and that without a second general
prostration.195

Jefferson takes a similarly skeptical but non-preemptive
approach of bringing to Carr’s attention the competing views
regarding whether Jesus was actually the Son of God.196
True, many people will reject this sort of counsel to
deliberate, and I am sure that many people believe that we
attain religious truths by way of things like the heavenly lights
and the literal conversation with God that transformed Paul on
the Damascus Road. But as one who has yet to be blessed with
such extraordinary experiences, I find useful a measured
skepticism, whether it be of the sort associated with Jefferson
or Milton, toward the discovery of some truth regarding
religion.
With this observation, I devote my time in the
subsequent sections to outlining the legal dimensions of
extending the justification from truth to religious expression.
IV.

IMPORTANCE OF RELIGION IN THE SUPREME COURT

The Supreme Court in New York Times reasoned that
the public’s right to a diversity of political speech was
warranted partly by the formal assumptions of democracy.
Similarly, in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, the Court
reasoned that the public’s access to a diversity of commercial
speech was warranted partly by the people’s desire for less
expensive prescription drugs. If we are to extend the
justification from truth and its attendant insistence on a
diversity of views, we should clarify the ways in which religion,
like democratic politics and consumer consumption, warrants
application of the justification. It is my intent to show that
religion, according to the Supreme Court, occupies or can
195
196

Id.
Jefferson advises Carr:

You will next read the New Testament. It is the history of a personage called
Jesus. Keep in your eye the opposite pretensions: 1, of those who say he was
begotten by God, born of a virgin, suspended and reversed the laws of nature
at will, and ascended bodily into heaven; and 2, of those who say he was a
man of illegitimate birth, of a benevolent heart, enthusiastic mind, who set
out without pretensions to divinity, ended in believing them, and was
punished capitally for sedition, by being gibbeted, according to the Roman
law, which punished the first commission of that offence by whipping, and
the second by exile, or death in furea . . . .
Id. at 399-400.
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occupy a place in a person’s life that is theoretically at least as
important as democratic politics or consumer consumption.
In New York Times and Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy, the Supreme Court appears to believe that the
audience is entitled to hear a diversity of viewpoints and ideas
for speech that is either political or commercial because there is
something worthy, even compelling, about being presumptively
well-informed in the arena of democratic politics or commercial
consumption. Yet if politics or commercial consumption
represents a potentially important endeavor where a person
can benefit from access to a diversity of viewpoints and ideas,
so too does religion. For while democratic politics and
commercial consumption are important, it is hard to justify
why religion is somehow less important in people’s lives. The
very idea of religion, after all, presupposes a set of beliefs about
an individual’s deepest moral convictions, the meaning of her
existence, the origins of her creation, and the possibility of
afterlife.197 And this premise is shared by not just religionists or
students of divinity. It finds support in a domain that is hardly
an exemplum of religiosity—the legal canon of the Supreme
Court. There, religion is defined as a source of one’s
profoundest meditations about the meaning of life as well as
the highest moral authority. Such characterization goes beyond
suggesting that religion should be viewed as at least as
important as politics or commercial consumption in a person’s
life. It suggests also that religionists deserve a right of
autonomy that is free from undue state regulation, and this
autonomy in turn implies that people should be able to get
access to religious expression, including a diverse array of
expression, to make better approximations about some
religious truth.
Even as the Supreme Court has ruled against particular
religious practices, it has consistently recognized the signal
importance of religion as an abstract idea. Justice Frankfurter,
197

Professor Marshall offers apt statements:

Religion is concerned centrally with the understanding of a transcendent
reality that explains and defines human existence. Whether God exists, for
example, is very much the question of what is transcendent truth. Similarly,
even for those religions which do not use a godhead, the essential religious
question of understanding one’s place in the universe is indivisible from the
question of what is truth.
Marshall, supra note 1, at 16. The psychologist Erich Fromm has also written that for
all major religions “man’s obligation to search for the truth is an integral postulate.”
FROMM, supra note 155, at 19.
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although deciding against a claim for exemption by Jehovah’s
Witnesses in Minersville School District v. Gobitis, nonetheless
asserted, “Certainly the affirmative pursuit of one’s convictions
about the ultimate mystery of the universe and man’s relation
to it is placed beyond the reach of law. Government may not
interfere with organized or individual expression of belief or
disbelief.”198 More emphatically, Justice Jackson in overturning
Frankfurter’s opinion announced in West Virginia State Board
of Education v. Barnette, “One’s right to . . . freedom of worship
and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be
submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no
elections.”199 Yet the Court’s recognition of religion as a
significant enterprise deserving of constitutional protection
preceded the twentieth century opinions of Justices Jackson
and Frankfurter. In an early example from the nineteenth
century, even as he rejected the Mormon’s arguments, Justice
Field for the Court stated in Davis v. Beason that the term
“‘religion’ has reference to one’s views of his relations to his
Creator, and to the obligations they impose of reverence for his
being and character, and of obedience to his will.”200
United States v. Seeger201 encapsulates for the
contemporary Supreme Court the concept of religion as
addressing ultimate questions and as constitutive of a
comprehensive worldview. The Seeger Court defined religion by
way of statutory interpretation rather than the First
Amendment, and thus we are not afforded a direct statement
about religion’s constitutional meaning. However, the
discussion in Seeger is still profitable because it represents the
closest attempt by the Court at a sustained definition of
religion. Daniel Seeger was convicted for refusing induction
into the armed forces. His refusal was not straightforward,
though. On the one hand, he sought under section 6(j) of the
Universal Military Training and Service Act an exemption for
those who “by reason of their religious training and belief are
conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any
form . . . .”202 On the other hand, Seeger “preferred to leave the

198
Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 593 (1940), overruled by
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
199
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 638.
200
Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890).
201
380 U.S. 163 (1965).
202
Id. at 164-66.
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question as to his belief in a Supreme Being open.”203 While
Seeger harbored a “skepticism or disbelief in the existence of
God,” he did “not necessarily mean lack of faith in anything
whatsoever.”204 Instead, his was a “belief in and devotion to
goodness and virtue for their own sakes, and a religious faith in
a purely ethical creed.”205 The Court was thus confronted with
deciding whether the term “religious belief” in section 6(j) of
the federal statute was capacious enough to accommodate
Seeger’s views. Although this task necessitated statutory
interpretation, it also permitted the Court an opportunity to
make indirectly some telling remarks about the meaning of
religion in the First Amendment.
In interpreting the statute’s reference to “religious
belief,” the Court spoke of the need to embrace “the everbroadening understanding of the modern religious community,”
but one common thread among these religions, according to the
Court, was an engagement with an ultimate being or some
metaphysical truth from which derived the highest moral
duties. Justice Clark for the Seeger Court quoted the dissenting
opinion of Chief Justice Hughes in United States v.
Macintosh.206 It was Hughes, Clark wrote, who “enunciated the
rationale behind the long recognition of conscientious objection
to participation in war accorded by Congress in our various
conscription laws when he declared that ‘in the forum of
conscience, duty to a moral power higher than the state has
always been maintained.’”207 According to Clark, the
Congressional statute at issue in Seeger “adopted almost intact
the language of Chief Justice Hughes in United States v.
Macintosh,” which stated that the “essence of religion is belief
in a relation to God involving duties superior to those arising
from any human relation.”208 With these premises in mind,
Clark permitted under section 6(j) “all sincere religious beliefs
203

Id. at 166.
Id.
205
Id.
206
Id. at 169 (quoting United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931)).
207
Id. at 169-70 (quoting Macintosh, 283 U.S. at 633).
208
Id. at 175 (quoting Macintosh, 283 U.S. at 633-34). So, too, Justice Clark
believed that Congress “must have had in mind the admonitions of the Chief Justice
when he said in the same opinion that even the word ‘God’ had myriad meanings for
men of faith: ‘[P]utting aside dogmas with their particular conceptions of deity, freedom
of conscience itself implies respect for an innate conviction of paramount duty.” Id. at
175-76 (quoting Macintosh, 283 U.S. at 634). Seeger referred to religion as involving
the “fundamental questions of man’s predicament in life, in death or in final judgment
and retribution.” Id. at 174.
204
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which are based upon a power or being, or upon a faith, to
which all else is subordinate or upon which all else is
ultimately dependent.”209 This is a striking claim, for I suspect
that no one on the Court would say that participation in
politics or commercial consumption makes all else
“subordinate” or is that “upon which all else is ultimately
dependent.”
Also worth considering is the Court’s discussion of the
theologian Paul Tillich. The Court quoted with approval the
following passage from one of Tillich’s books:
And if that word (God) has not much meaning for you, translate it,
and speak of the depths of your life, of the source of your being, or
your ultimate concern, of what you take seriously without any
reservation. Perhaps, in order to do so, you must forget everything
traditional that you have learned about God . . . .210

In the passage, the definition of religion need not be restricted
to a standard Western Christian model. But according to both
Tillich and the Court it does have to speak to an individual’s
greatest existential concerns: the “depths of your life, of the
source of your being, or your ultimate concern, of what you take
seriously without any reservation.” Again, we cannot similarly
announce that, as a general matter, voting for a mayoral or
even a presidential candidate or buying cheaper prescription
drugs goes to the “depths of your life, of the source of your
being, or your ultimate concern, of what you take seriously
without any reservation.”
The Supreme Court expanded its definition of religion in
Welsh v. United States.211 Like Seeger, this case finds the Court
having to grapple with the terms of section 6(j) of the Universal
Military Training and Service Act. But unlike Seeger, who at
least professed the possibility that he might be considered
religious under section 6(j), Elliot Welsh flatly disclaimed any
belief in God.212 His moral resistance to war was instead formed
by “reading in the fields of history and sociology.”213 Yet the
Court concluded that Welsh’s morals were sufficiently
analogous to the statute’s definition of religion, partly because
the Court of Appeals decided that Welsh’s beliefs were
209
210

Seeger, 380 U.S. at 176.
Id. at 187 (quoting PAUL TILLICH, THE SHAKING OF THE FOUNDATIONS 57

(1948)).
211
212
213

398 U.S. 333 (1970).
Id. at 341.
Id.
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analogous to “the strength of more traditional religious
convictions . . . .”214 Again, what I wish to stress is how the
Court views religion as an important and even paramount
moral enterprise, for Welsh would not have been permitted an
exception under section 6(j) had he merely asserted that he
sincerely held moral beliefs against war that bore no structural
correspondence to religion.215 In this way, the concept of
conscientious objector status illustrates how religious
expression under some circumstances appears to draw greater
constitutional protection than secular speech alone. Given that
according to the Supreme Court religion is analogous to and
expressive of our deepest moral convictions, it seems
reasonable to suggest that the right of free exercise should be
justified in part by the right of people to have access to
religious expression.216
V.

HOW THE RELIGION CLAUSES PROMOTE DELIBERATION

If deliberation over a diversity of views is a potentially
useful means to arrive at the truth about religion or a
particular religion, does the Constitution afford the means by
which people can so deliberate? I believe it does. Specifically,
the two religion clauses, especially when read together, forbid
the state from invading the privacy that one needs in order to
weigh competing religious perspectives.217
214

Id. at 337.
Here, it is worth considering Chief Justice Burger’s majority opinion in
Wisconsin v. Yoder where he distinguished the constitutional status of religious
expression and secular speech:
215

Although a determination of what is a “religious” belief or practice entitled to
constitutional protection may present a most delicate question, the very
concept of ordered liberty precludes allowing every person to make his own
standards on matters of conduct in which society as a whole has important
interests. Thus, if the Amish asserted their claims because of their subjective
evaluation and rejection of the contemporary secular values accepted by the
majority, much as Thoreau rejected the social values of his time and isolated
himself at Walden Pond, their claims would not rest on a religious basis.
Thoreau’s choice was philosophical and personal rather than religious, and
such belief does not rise to the demands of the Religion Clauses.
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972) (footnote omitted).
216
Or, stated differently, if commercials for five different brands of toothpaste
can be justified by the Court in terms of informing the audience, surely we could say
the same for religious expression.
217
Professor Marshall has made a complementary argument but he argues
that the religion clauses forbid the state to monopolize a truth concerning religion.
Marshall, supra note 12, at 255-60. I make the different argument that the clauses
tend to promote a diversity of viewpoints. In this way, I am inclined to believe that he
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The Free Exercise Clause

In order to deliberate on a diversity of viewpoints
concerning religion, one needs a legal space that is sufficiently
free from state interference, whether that interference
manifests itself as informal coercion or formal penalties. The
Free Exercise Clause provides protection against such
interference. For inherent in the Free Exercise Clause is a
commitment to a liberty of conscience, which, “as understood at
American law today, embraces the freedom of the person to
choose or to change religious beliefs or practices without
coercion or control by government and without facing
discrimination or penalties for the religious choices once
made.”218 This right of freedom of conscience has been protected
on both an organizational and an individual level.
On the organization level, the Supreme Court has
protected the right of churches and religious corporate bodies
to be shielded from states’ attempts to impose their views of
religion. An early iteration of this commitment was announced
by the Court in Watson v. Jones.219 In Watson, two rival
Presbyterian factions in Kentucky disagreed about which
should own a church.220 One faction argued that its teachings
were most consistent with the church’s original intent.221 The
Court refused to adjudicate the matter based on interpretations
about religious doctrine.222 Its rationale read:
In this country the full and free right to entertain any religious
belief, to practice any religious principle, and to teach any religious
doctrine which does not violate the laws of morality and property,
and which does not infringe personal rights, is conceded to all. The
law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of no dogma,
the establishment of no sect. The right to organize voluntary
religious associations to assist in the expression and dissemination
of any religious doctrine, and to create tribunals for the decision of
controverted questions of faith within the association, and for the
ecclesiastical government of all the individual members,
is making an argument that is conceptually similar to Holmes’s version of the
justification from truth while I am making an argument that is closer to the logic of
Brandeis’s version. For the distinction between the Holmes and Brandeis, see supra
Part I.
218
JOHN WITTE, JR., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
EXPERIMENT: ESSENTIAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 130 (2000); see also supra note 11
(para. 2).
219
80 U.S. 679 (1871).
220
Id. at 703.
221
Id. at 698.
222
Id. at 727-29.
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congregations, and officers within the general association, is
unquestioned.223

While Watson concerned a mainstream group in the
Presbyterians, United States v. Ballard showed a Supreme
Court willing to extend the protection of religious free exercise
to more exotic churches and thus signaled the Court’s
recognition of the value of religious diversity.224 The leaders of a
church in Ballard were charged with violating a federal statute
that prohibited the use of the mail to conduct fraud.225 They
were said to have misrepresented themselves by way of absurd
and inconsistent promises. For example, Guy Ballard, the
church leader, had called himself Saint Germain, Jesus, and
George Washington.226 He also claimed to possess supernatural
powers to heal those afflicted with “any diseases, injuries, or
ailments.”227 In the face of these eccentric, if not absurd, claims,
the Court nonetheless asserted that the Free Exercise Clause
must protect even the strangest of religious beliefs. Justice
Douglas remanded the case and stressed to the lower court the
importance of protecting the freedom of religious belief, even
those beliefs that may be “incomprehensible” to some.228
The Court continued to protect the free exercise rights
of religious organizations in other cases by protecting the
rights of their members to deliberate about their spiritual
issues. In Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral,229 the Court
invalidated a New York statute that sought to prevent the
Russian Orthodox Church in Moscow from appointing a bishop
in New York who would take possession of a Russian Orthodox
church in that state.230 The rather unusual legislative
prohibition was the result of a conflict between Communistappointed Russian Orthodox leaders and some of their
American counterparts who, contrary to tradition, no longer
wanted to be under the former’s jurisdictional control.231 Trying
to strike a blow for patriotism, New York passed legislation

223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231

Id. at 728-29.
United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944).
Id. at 79.
Id.
Id. at 80.
Id. at 86.
344 U.S. 94 (1952).
Id. at 107.
Id. at 95-108.
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that sided with the American members of the church.232 Kedroff
argued that the Free Exercise Clause forbade such legislation.
Justice Reed stated for the Court that in this case there is “a
transfer by statute of control over churches” which therefore
“violates our rule of separation between church and state.”233
The Court emphasized the “spirit of freedom for religious
organizations, an independence from secular control or
manipulation—in short, power to decide for themselves, free
from state interference, matters of church government as well
as those of faith and doctrine.”234
The Court has also sought to protect the free exercise
rights of individuals. In Cantwell v. Connecticut, the first case
in which the Court analyzed the right of religious exercise with
respect to a state law, Justice Roberts wrote that the right of
religious free exercise for individuals as such “forestalls
compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the
practice of any form of worship” and that “[f]reedom of
conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious organization
or form of worship as the individual may choose cannot be
restricted by law.”235 Similarly, three years later, Justice
Jackson in Barnette extended protection to the religious
practices of Jehovah’s Witnesses with the following words: “If
there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is
that no official, high or petty, can prescribe which shall be
orthodox in . . . religion, or other matters of opinion . . . .”236
Some of the Court’s most prominent free exercise
decisions involved individuals who sought exemptions from
generally applicable laws in the area of unemployment
benefits. Sherbert v. Verner237 was one of the first of such cases.
After being fired for refusing to work on Saturday, her Sabbath
Day, a Seventh Day Adventist was denied unemployment
benefits by a state agency.238 Justice Brennan for the Court
remanded the decision but left little doubt as to how he wanted
the lower court to decide.239 According to Brennan, “to condition
the availability of benefits upon this appellant’s willingness to
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239

See Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 97-99.
Id. at 110.
Id. at 116.
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
374 U.S. 398 (1963).
Id. at 399-401.
Id. at 402.
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violate a cardinal principle of her religious faith effectively
penalizes the free exercise of her constitutional liberties.”240 The
Court rendered a philosophically consonant opinion in Thomas
v. Review Board.241 Here, too, a person refused work because he
saw it as violating his religious beliefs. After being discharged
for his refusal to work building gun turrets for tanks, a
Jehovah’s Witness, like Sherbert’s Seventh Day Adventist, was
denied unemployment benefits by a state agency. Chief Justice
Burger for the Court found the denial to be a violation of the
Free Exercise Clause. Burger explained:
Where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon
conduct proscribed by a religious faith, or where it denies such a
benefit because of conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby
putting substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior
and to violate his beliefs, a burden upon religion exists. While the
compulsion may be indirect, the infringement upon free exercise is
nonetheless substantial.242

Thomas, like Sherbert, stands for the proposition that the state
should not impose a monopoly of truth about religion by
coercing people to violate their beliefs or impairing the
deliberative processes that produce them.
Yet if Thomas represented a high mark of contemporary
judicial protection for free exercise, Employment Division v.
Smith243 represented a decidedly low one. Oregon had a statute
that prohibited “the knowing or intentional possession of a
‘controlled substance’ unless the substance has been prescribed
by a medical practitioner.”244 A member of the Native American
Church, Alfred Smith ingested peyote, a controlled substance
under the statute, as part of his religious practices.245 Smith’s
employer found out and became angry, for Smith worked as a
240

Id. at 406. The Court reiterated this statement in Hobbie v. Unemployment
Appeals Commission of Florida. 480 U.S. 136, 146 (1987) (“Here, as in Sherbert and
Thomas, the State may not force an employee ‘to choose between following the precepts
of her religion and forfeiting benefits, . . . and abandoning one of the precepts of her
religion in order to accept work.’ ”).
241
Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707
(1981).
242
Id. at 717-18.
243
Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990), superseded by statute, Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No.
103-141, 107 Stat. 1488, invalidated in part by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507
(1997) and recognized in part by Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do
Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006).
244
Id. at 874.
245
Id.

62

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:1

counselor at a drug rehabilitation center and his employer felt
that the activity, while performed outside the workplace, was
nonetheless incompatible with the duties of a drug counselor.246
After being fired, Smith sought but was denied unemployment
benefits from the state because he “had been discharged for
work-related ‘misconduct.’”247 He sued the state unemployment
agency for violating his right of free exercise. The case
eventually made its way to the United States Supreme Court.
Justice Scalia for the majority rejected Smith’s
argument and offered what many regard as a surprisingly
unsympathetic view of religious liberty. He began with the
relatively uncontroversial statement that the justices “have
never held that an individual’s religious beliefs excuse him
from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting
conduct that the State is free to regulate.”248 This banal
pronouncement soon gave way to more elaborate and
restrictive reasoning, a move foreshadowed by Scalia’s
resurrection of Justice Frankfurter’s opinion in Gobitis.249
Scalia announced a controversial interpretation of the case law
by declaring that the “only decisions in which we have held
that the First Amendment bars application of a neutral,
generally applicable law to religiously motivated action have
involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free
Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional
protections . . . .”250 He also rejected the argument that the
protectiveness of the Sherbert test should govern this case.251
246
247
248
249

Smith, 494 U.S. at 872.
Id. at 874.
Id. at 878-79.
Scalia invoked the following language from Frankfurter’s opinion:

Conscientious scruples have not, in the course of the long struggle for
religious toleration, relieved the individual from obedience to a general law
not aimed at the promotion or restriction of religious beliefs. The mere
possession of religious convictions which contradict the relevant concerns of a
political society does not relieve the citizen from the discharge of political
responsibilities (footnote omitted).
Id. at 879 (quoting Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594-95 (1940),
overruled by W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)).
250
Id. at 881. The Court decided that Oregon’s prohibition on peyote was a
generally applicable law that merited nothing higher than rational review, which it
passed. Id. at 878-81.
251
Scalia wrote:
Under the Sherbert test, governmental actions that substantially burden a
religious practice must be justified by a compelling governmental interest.
Applying that test we have, on three occasions, invalidated state
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Through these two maneuvers, Scalia drew considerable
criticism from other justices and legal scholars as well as from
Congress.252 It is not my aim to evaluate these criticisms but
rather to clarify and underscore how Scalia’s opinion, despite
its reputation in some quarters as unresponsive to religionists
who belong to minority faiths,253 nonetheless rejected the view
that the state may compel affirmation of some truth about
religion. For he wrote:
The free exercise of religion means, first and foremost, the right to
believe and profess whatever religious doctrine one desires. Thus,
the First Amendment obviously excludes all “governmental
regulation of religious beliefs as such.” . . . The government may not
compel affirmation of religious belief, . . . punish the expression of
religious doctrines it believes to be false, . . . impose special
disabilities on the basis of religious views or religious status, . . . or
lend its power to one or the other side in controversies over religious
authority or dogma . . . .254

While many religionists were dismayed by Scalia’s opinion,
what remains clear is that Smith is dedicated in principle to
the position that the state should permit people the space in
which to deliberate about a diversity of beliefs.
B.

The Establishment Clause

Like the Free Exercise Clause, the Establishment
Clause also preserves a space in which the individual can,
without undue state interference, deliberate about a diversity
of views on religion. Explicating this position however is not a
straightforward task, given that there is disagreement about
unemployment compensation rules that conditioned the availability of
benefits upon an applicant’s willingness to work under conditions forbidden
by his religion. We have never invalidated any governmental action on the
basis of the Sherbert test except the denial of unemployment compensation.
Although we have sometimes purported to apply the Sherbert test in contexts
other than that, we have always found the test satisfied. In recent years we
have abstained from applying the Sherbert test (outside the unemployment
compensation field) at all.
Id. at 883 (citations omitted).
252
Congress, in an attempt to overturn Scalia’s opinion, passed the American
Indian Religious Freedom Act Amendments of 1994. Pub. L. No. 103-344, 108 Stat.
3125 (1994) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1996a (2000)).
253
See, e.g., CARTER, supra note 134, at 128-29 (“The judgment against the
Native American Church [in Smith], however, demonstrates that the political process
will protect only the mainstream religions, not many smaller groups that exist at the
margins.”).
254
Smith, 494 U.S. at 877.
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what is the proper test to adjudicate a violation of the
Establishment Clause. I will not attempt to settle the debate, a
job that would take me outside the aims of this Article. But I
will argue that under all of the prominent judicial tests, the
Court has made clear that the Establishment Clause prohibits
the state from claiming a monopoly on religious truth. There
are essentially three255 prominent judicial theories for
underwriting the Establishment Clause256: strict separation,
neutrality, and accommodation.
The strict separation theory aspires to the maximum
separation of church and state. Its most famous American
expositor is Thomas Jefferson, who made clear his advocacy for
the separation of church and state in his letter to the Danbury
Baptist Association in 1802. There, he penned his famous
metaphor of a “wall of a separation between church and state”:
I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole
American people which declared that their legislature should “make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof,” thus building a wall of separation between
church and State.257

In the case law, Everson v. Board of Education258 represents the
single most emphatic endorsement of this strict separation
theory.259 While Justice Black wrote the majority opinion and
Justice Rutledge the dissent, both subscribed to a version of
strict separation that denied the state’s ability to monopolize
religious truth. Black initially wrote: “The ‘establishment of
religion’ clause of the First Amendment means at least this:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a
church.”260 What followed was an illuminating commitment to
protecting opportunities for people to deliberate about a
diversity of views regarding religion. Black asserted that

255

While some scholars might argue that there are more, mostly for purposes
of convenience, I will bypass some of the subtler differences.
256
Professor Witte has identified additional judicial theories for
disestablishment: separationism, accomodationism, neutrality, endorsement, and equal
treatment. WITTE, supra note 218, at 152-63.
257
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Messrs. Nehemiah Dodge, Ephraim
Robbins, and Stephen S. Nelson, A Committee of the Danbury Baptist Association, in
the State of Connecticut (Jan. 1, 1802), in THE LIFE, supra note 188, at 307, 307.
258
330 U.S. 1 (1947).
259
In Everson, the state permitted school boards to reimburse parents who
sent their children to private schools, including Catholic schools, for the cost of
transportation to and from the school. Id. at 16-18.
260
Id. at 15.
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neither the state nor the federal government “can pass laws
which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion
over another.”261 By adopting this position of neutrality, one can
read the Establishment Clause as affording equal opportunities
for all religionists to deliberate about their faiths. Black’s
commitment to neutrality animated his other statements:
[Neither state nor federal government] can force nor influence a
person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or
force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person
can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or
disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any
amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious
activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever
form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor
the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the
affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa.262

Although dissenting in the same case that contains this
passage, Justice Rutledge was no less committed to the
abstract proposition of strict separation, and, accordingly, his
justifications can also be interpreted as supporting protection
for the deliberation of diverse faiths.263 He wrote:
The Amendment’s purpose was not to strike merely at the official
establishment of a single sect, creed or religion, outlawing only a
formal relation such as had prevailed in England and some of the
colonies. Necessarily it was to uproot all such relationships. But the
object was broader than separating church and state in this narrow
sense. It was to create a complete and permanent separation of the
spheres of religious activity and civil authority by comprehensively
forbidding every form of public aid or support for religion.264

This staunch commitment to separation of church and state
characterized the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence
from Everson to the 1980s.265
What has come to partly replace the strict separation
approach is the neutrality approach. The neutrality approach
261

Id. at 15-16. For similar views, see, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S.
97, 103-04 (1968) (“Government in our democracy, state and national, must be neutral
in matters of religious theory, doctrine, and practice.”).
262
Id. at 15.
263
Of course, “the very fact that Justices who agreed on the governing
principle could divide so sharply on the result suggests that the principle evoked by the
image of a wall furnishes less guidance than metaphor.” TRIBE, supra note 3, at 1166.
264
Everson, 330 U.S. at 31-32.
265
Ira C. Lupu, The Lingering Death of Separationism, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
230, 233-34 (1994) (Strict separation “became the ‘official’ history of the
[establishment] clause until challenged by scholars and Justices in the early 1980s.”).
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to the Establishment Clause seeks to ensure that the state
neither advances one religion over another nor advances
religion over secularism or secularism over religion. In the
Supreme Court, this approach has taken the form of an
endorsement test, and Justice O’Connor assumed the role of
one of its main articulators. In Lynch v. Donnelly, she began
her concurring opinion with the announcement that the
“Establishment Clause prohibits government from making
adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person’s
standing in the political community.”266 She further explained:
Government can run afoul of that prohibition in two principal ways.
One is excessive entanglement with religious institutions, which
may interfere with the independence of the institutions, give the
institutions access to government or governmental powers not fully
shared by nonadherents of the religion, and foster the creation of
political constituencies defined along religious lines . . . . The second
and more direct infringement is government endorsement or
disapproval of religion. Endorsement sends a message to
nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the
political community, and an accompanying message to adherents
that they are insiders, favored members of the political community.
Disapproval sends the opposite message.267

What chiefly distinguishes the endorsement test from the strict
separation test, then, is the former’s commitment to social
inclusion and equal citizenship.268 Here too, however, the
endorsement test, like the strict separation test, can be
interpreted as an attempt to protect spaces for religionists to
deliberate about a diversity of views. For no matter the view,
the state is prohibited from stigmatizing, and thus coercing,
people on the basis of what they choose to deliberate.
The accommodation approach, compared to the
neutrality approach, is less protective of the religionist; for
while the latter requires the religionist to show that the law
makes her feel unwelcome, the former requires the religionist
to show that the law goes further by coercing her to conform
her beliefs to those privileged by the state. Lee v. Weisman269 is
a prime example of this approach. In that case, the principal of
a public middle school invited a rabbi to deliver a

266

Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
Id. at 687-88 (citation omitted).
268
For a complementary perspective, see KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO
AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE CONSTITUTION (1989).
269
505 U.S. 577 (1992).
267
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nondenominational prayer at the graduation ceremony.270 The
prayer was prepared by the National Conference of Christians
and Jews and was meant to be governed by a spirit of
“inclusiveness and sensitivity.”271 Justice Kennedy for the Court
found the prayer to violate the Establishment Clause because
it had the tendency to coerce students who did not wish to
participate in the prayer.272 According to Kennedy, “It is beyond
dispute that, at a minimum, the Constitution guarantees that
government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in
religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in a way which
‘establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do

270

Id. at 581.
Id. There were two prayers, an Invocation and a Benediction. The
Invocation read:
271

God of the Free, Hope of the Brave:
For the legacy of America where diversity is celebrated and the rights of
minorities are protected, we thank You. May these young men and women
grow up to enrich it.
For the liberty of America, we thank You. May these new graduates grow up
to guard it.
For the political process of America in which all its citizens may participate,
for its court system where all may seek justice we thank You. May those we
honor this morning always turn to it in trust.
For the destiny of America we thank You. May the graduates of Nathan
Bishop Middle School so live that they might help to share it.
May our aspirations for our country and for these young people, who are our
hope for the future, be richly fulfilled.
Amen.
The Benediction read:
O God, we are grateful to You for having endowed us with the capacity for
learning which we have celebrated on this joyous commencement.
Happy families give thanks for seeing their children achieve an important
milestone. Send Your blessings upon the teachers and administrators who
helped prepare them.
The graduates now need strength and guidance for the future, help them to
understand that we are not complete with academic knowledge alone. We
must each strive to fulfill what You require of us all: To do justly, to love
mercy, to walk humbly.
We give thanks to You, Lord, for keeping us alive, sustaining us and allowing
us to reach this special, happy occasion.
Amen.
Id. at 581-82.
272
Id. at 589-94.
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so.’ ”273 However, there was a danger that such coercion would
occur at the public school, where the state had such complete
control over the graduation ceremony that the prayer became
“a state-sanctioned religious exercise in which the student was
left with no alternative but to submit.”274
While there may be disagreement, as there was on the
Court itself, about whether the school prayer rose to the level of
coercion, what remains clear is that the Court’s preoccupation
with coercion under the accommodation approach reflects a
strong commitment to protecting people’s rights to deliberate
about a diversity of religious views without undue state
intervention. Thus, the Constitution’s religion clauses, as
interpreted by the Supreme Court, provide protections that
allow for the deliberation of religious truth, thereby making the
justification from truth a viable possibility in the context of
religion.
VI.

APPLICATIONS

Thus far, I have tried to formulate the legal foundations
of the justification from truth for purposes of religious
expression. Now I want to explain how this justification would
possibly manifest itself in the case law. In doing so, I try to
explain first how the justification would articulate its terms in
a given set of case facts, and second, how the justification
would serve as an adjudicative principle by deciding in favor of
one party and against another. To offer as lucid of an account
as possible, I begin with some relatively easy cases where the
Supreme Court itself appeared to be applying a version of the
justification from truth. I then move to cases where application
of the justification from truth can generate new arguments for
cases in which the Supreme Court relied on a different
justification.
A.

Religious Proselytism

I want to start with the relatively easy cases where the
Supreme Court itself has at least hinted that it was applying
the justification from truth to religious expression. What
makes these cases so amenable to this justification is that they
involve proselytizing, that is, efforts to persuade the audience
273
274

Lee, 505 U.S. at 587 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984)).
Id. at 597.
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that a given religion is the truth.275 Cantwell v. Connecticut276 is
an excellent example. A Jehovah’s Witness named Newton
Cantwell, along with his two sons, played a phonographic
record in an area where “about ninety per cent of the residents
are Roman Catholics.”277 The record “included an attack on the
Catholic religion.”278 Cantwell asked two men walking the
street whether they would be interested in hearing the record,
and they acquiesced.279 Upon hearing the record, both men
“were incensed by the contents of the record and were tempted
to strike Cantwell unless he went away.”280 Cantwell and his
sons were charged with and convicted of invoking or inciting
others to breach of the peace.281
Their case eventually made its way to the Supreme
Court.282 Writing for the Court, Justice Roberts overturned
Cantwell’s conviction by offering a justification that departed
in crucial ways from the Court’s standard justification for
religious conscience. He wrote:
We find in the instant case no assault or threatening of bodily harm,
no truculent bearing, no intentional discourtesy, no personal abuse.
On the contrary, we find only an effort to persuade a willing listener
to buy a book or to contribute money in the interest of what
Cantwell, however misguided others may think him, conceived to be
true religion.
In the realm of religious faith, and in that of political belief, sharp
differences arise. In both fields the tenets of one man may seem the
rankest error to his neighbor. To persuade others to his own point of
view, the pleader, as we know, at times, resorts to exaggeration, to
vilification of men who have been, or are, prominent in church or
state, and even to false statement. But the people of this nation have
ordained in the light of history, that, in spite of the probability of
excesses and abuses, these liberties are, in the long view, essential to

275
The Oxford English Dictionary defines “proselyte” as “to cause to come over
or turn from one opinion, belief, creed, or party to another; esp. to convert from one
religious faith or sect to another.” 12 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 24, at
664.
276
310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940).
277
Id. at 301.
278
Id.
279
Id. at 302-03.
280
Id. at 303.
281
Id.
282
This was also the first Supreme Court case that made the right of free
religious exercise applicable to states by incorporating the right through the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. See id.
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enlightened opinion and right conduct on the part of the citizens of a
democracy.283

What is intriguing about this opinion is Roberts’s apparent
suggestion that the right of religious free exercise is not simply
relevant for the religionist who wishes to espouse her faith.
According to Roberts, religious expression can also profit the
audience: “But the people of this nation have ordained in the
light of history, that, in spite of the probability of excesses and
abuses, these liberties are, in the long view, essential to
enlightened opinion and right conduct on the part of the
citizens of a democracy.”284 Here, Roberts seems to suggest that
religious expression goes beyond being merely tolerated as an
inevitable, if quirky, anomaly in a predominantly liberal
secular culture.285 Rather, Roberts emphasizes the positive
impact of religious expression by alluding to what I have called
the justification from truth.
A similar application of the justification from truth to
religious expression appears in Marsh v. Alabama.286 In Marsh,
a Jehovah’s Witness sought to distribute religious literature in
a company town named Chickasaw.287 The stores in the town
had posted the following sign: “This Is Private Property, and
Without Written Permission, No Street, or Horse Vendor,
Agent or Solicitation of Any Kind Will Be Permitted.”288 After
the Jehovah’s Witnesses refused to comply with this sign, they
were arrested for violating a state statute that made “it a crime
to enter or remain on the premises of another after having been
warned not to do so.”289 The Jehovah’s Witnesses eventually
appealed their case to the Supreme Court.290 Justice Black for
the Court phrased the issue in a way that alluded to his
reliance on the justification from truth. He wrote, “Our
question then narrows down to this: Can those people who live
in or come to Chickasaw be denied freedom of press and
religion simply because a single company has legal title to all
the town?”291 Tellingly, Black located the right of religious free
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291

Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 311.
Id. at 310.
So bemoans Stephen Carter. See CARTER, supra note 134, at 21-22.
326 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1946).
Id. at 502.
Id. at 503.
Id. at 503-04.
Id. at 503.
Id. at 505 (emphasis added).
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exercise not just in the speaker but also in the audience, and
thus implied that the audience has a right to hear and read
religious expression, including a diversity of such expression.
Black made this assumption explicit later in his opinion. After
rejecting the arrests as violative of the right of free exercise, he
wrote:
Many people in the United States live in company-owned towns.
These people, just as residents of municipalities, are free citizens of
their State and country. Just as all other citizens they must make
decisions which affect the welfare of community and nation. To act
as good citizens they must be informed. In order to enable them to be
properly informed their information must be uncensored.292

Just as Justice Roberts in Cantwell explained that religious
expression is necessary for “citizens of a democracy” to form
“enlightened opinions,” Black reasoned that religious
expression is important in order for people “to act as good
citizens” who are “informed.”293 Cases like this involving
religious proselytizing have marshaled some version of the
justification from truth, although without elaborating its logic
and foundations.294 But what should we make of those cases
that do not involve proselytizing? I take them up next.
B.

Non-Proselytizing and No Intent to Persuade

The previous discussion might lead one to believe that
the justification from truth is inappropriate for speech that
does not deliberately seek to proselytize. Indeed, all of the
political speech and commercial speech cases that I have
discussed involved speakers who were deliberately trying to
persuade others through speeches, leaflets, and the like. Yet, as
I argue later, even if someone has no intent to persuade others,
her speech or expression can inform an audience and stimulate
deliberation. Therefore, the justification from truth should be
applied to these examples as well.
When speakers have not deliberately sought to
communicate a message to others, the Supreme Court, if it
292

Id. at 508.
Id.
294
See, e.g., Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620,
632 (1980) (“Soliciting financial support is undoubtedly subject to reasonable
regulation but the latter must be undertaken with due regard for the reality that
solicitation is characteristically intertwined with informative and perhaps persuasive
speech seeking support for particular causes or for particular views on economic,
political, or social issues . . . .”).
293
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wishes to protect the expression, might be tempted to apply
what I call the justification from conscience. According to this
justification, the Court protects the First Amendment rights of
a speaker so that she may be faithful to her conscience.295 An
example of such a speaker is found in Henry David Thoreau.
Thoreau urged people to accept jail confinement rather than
underwrite through their taxes a government that sanctions
slavery:
I know this well, that if one thousand, if one hundred, if ten men
whom I could name,—if ten honest men only,—ay, if one HONEST
man, in this State of Massachusetts, ceasing to hold slaves, were to
[refuse to pay his taxes] and be locked up in the county jail therefore,
it would be the abolition of slavery in America. For it matters not
how small the beginning may seem to be: what is once well done is
done forever.296

Here, the act of civil disobedience is performed not primarily to
benefit the community, for one man’s lone decision to serve jail
time hardly signals “the abolition of slavery in America.”
Rather, the dramatic gesture is meant to cleanse one’s
conscience.297 It is an act to demonstrate both to the community
and to one’s self what one is really made of. The speech act is
thus not simply expressive but also affirmative of one’s moral
conscience.
A similar understanding regarding the significance of
speech acts informs the Supreme Court’s opinion in Cohen v.
California.298 There, the Court reversed the prosecution of one
Robert Cohen who violated a disturbance of the peace statute
for wearing in a Los Angeles courthouse a jacket emblazoned
with the words “Fuck the Draft.”299 Justice Harlan for the Court
reasoned that the First Amendment protected Cohen’s
expression, and part of his justification stemmed from the view
that Cohen’s message contained “inexpressible emotions.”300 In
thus characterizing Cohen’s speech, Harlan did not appear to
regard the speech as trying to convey a meaning to an
audience, for the emotion in Cohen’s speech was said to be

295

See supra note 11 (2d paragraph).
Henry David Thoreau, Civil Disobedience, in COLLECTED ESSAYS AND
POEMS 203, 212 (Elizabeth Hall Witherell ed., Library of America 2001) (1849).
297
For related discussion, see HANNAH ARENDT, CRISES OF THE REPUBLIC 5868 (1972).
298
403 U.S. 15 (1971).
299
Id. at 16.
300
Id. at 26.
296

2007]

DELIBERATING THE DIVINE

73

“inexpressible.” Pregnant with inexpressible emotions, the
speech was better understood as trying to affirm the nonverbal
passions of Cohen’s conscience, and Harlan’s opinion is best
interpreted as an attempt to make legal space for such
affirmation.
But there is an important ambivalence that complicates
the assumption that Cohen is merely a case about affirming
one’s conscience. Harlan wrote that Cohen’s speech also
involved a “communicative function” and his profanity might
have been “the more important element of the overall message
sought to be communicated.”301 Furthermore, Harlan stated
that the right of free speech is “designed and intended to
remove governmental restraints from the arena of public
discussion . . . .”302 This sort of conceptual ambivalence is
reproduced in other examples involving political speech that
are partially underwritten by the justification from conscience.
Consider Thoreau’s decision to go to jail rather than to
pay taxes that would indirectly support slavery. As I have
suggested, his jail time could not, as he claimed, amount to “the
abolition of slavery in America” and is better understood as an
act of moral self-fulfillment, a cleansing of his conscience. But
it was more than that. For Thoreau attempted to justify, not
simply to himself, but to others, his refusal to pay taxes, and he
attempted to urge other men to follow his lead as a means of
asserting their morally informed manhood against an evil
state. That Thoreau’s rhetoric is sometimes shrill and
indignant must not obscure his desire to urge others to political
action.303
301

Id. at 25-26 (citing Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 673-74

(1944)).
302

Id. at 24.
An important reason why political speech tends to resist classification as
nothing other than the affirmation of one’s conscience is because politics is not
conventionally understood as an enterprise that involves a single individual, nor one
where the value of expression resides solely in the lone individual. Politics necessarily
involves living and working with others, as suggested by its definition. The Oxford
English Dictionary defines “political” as follows: “Of, belonging, or pertaining to the
state or body of citizens, its government and policy . . . .” 12 OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY, supra note 24, at 32. Also, an erstwhile definition of “politics” is given as
the “public or social ethics, that branch of moral philosophy dealing with the state or
social organism as a whole (obs.).” Id. These descriptions suggest an association with
others, and hence a working together with them.
This concept is captured well in Aristotle’s observation that “man is by
nature a political animal,” meaning that the human being by nature desires to live
with others. ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 37 (Carnes Lord trans., Univ. of Chi. Press,
1984). For one “who is incapable of participating nor who is in need of nothing through
being self-sufficient is no part of a city, and so is either a beast or a god.” Id. Tellingly,
303
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In the context of religious acts, the Court has sometimes
justified the right of religious expression in terms of the
justification from conscience. Consider once more Thomas v.
Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division.304
While factually quite different from the profanity of Cohen, the
religious dimension in Thomas was regarded by the Court as
presenting a similar question of conscience. One Eddie Thomas
was a foundry worker in Indiana who was transferred from
making steel sheeting to making tank gun turrets.305 As a
Jehovah’s Witness, he refused to participate in activities that
would contribute to war. Thomas quit his job and sought
unemployment benefits.306 The Indiana Supreme Court refused
to permit the dispensing of such benefits because “‘although
the claimant’s reasons for quitting were described as religious,
it was unclear what his belief was, and what the religious basis
of his belief was.’”307 The confusion or doubt is quite excusable,
for how could producing steel sheeting that could be added to a
tank’s armor differ morally from building its turret in terms of
leading to its construction and hence its availability for
assault? Besides, the Indiana Supreme Court could point to
another Jehovah’s Witness who had no qualms about making
turrets.308 Still, on appeal, Chief Justice Burger, writing for the
United States Supreme Court, reversed the Indiana Supreme
Court, stating that
Thomas drew a line, and it is not for us to say that the line he drew
was an unreasonable one. Courts should not undertake to dissect
religious beliefs because the believer admits that he is “struggling”
with his position or because his beliefs are not articulated with the
clarity and precision that a more sophisticated person might
employ.309

Aristotle points to “speech” as the defining characteristic of man’s status as a political
animal, because “man alone among the animals has speech,” and it is speech that
permits us to communicate to each other the “advantageous and the harmful, and
hence also the just and the unjust.” See id. What makes speech political here is its
capacity to communicate ideas to others. This is not to say that your criticizing the
president while you are on a deserted island is not political speech; in terms of its
content, it obviously is. It is instead to suggest that we tend to value political speech
because such speech can persuade and inform an audience.
304
450 U.S. 707 (1981).
305
Id. at 709.
306
Id. at 710.
307
Id. at 741 (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec.
Div., 391 N.E.2d 1127, 1133 (Ind. 1979)).
308
Id. at 715.
309
Id.
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Here, Chief Justice Burger does not justify Thomas’s
expression as constitutionally protected because it is likely to
persuade or cause to reflect anyone who witnesses it; Burger
thus avoids the justification from truth. Burger instead
justifies his decision by turning to the justification from
conscience. He seems to imply that no one—including other
Jehovah’s Witnesses—would necessarily even understand
Thomas’s actions as coherent. The action is constitutionally
protected, it seems, largely because it is the way that Thomas
himself has come to terms with his religion.310 It seems
instinctively right to justify religious expression in terms of the
justification from conscience.
On the other hand, there is something curious about
justifying the right of religious expression exclusively in terms
of conscience and not the justification from truth. For religious
speech, like political speech, can inform and persuade its
audience. And here we need not just invoke the familiar idea of
religious proselytism. We can also imagine how the audience
can learn from the religious expression of someone whose
primary motivation is not to educate others. Recall that Chief
Justice Burger justified Thomas’s right of religious expression
as a means of being faithful to the latter’s religious conscience,
but he could have just as well invoked the justification from
truth. While Burger conceded that Thomas’s refusal might not
have been necessitated by his religion and might have been
wanting in coherence, the message was nonetheless clear in its
general meaning: helping to build military weapons violates
the Jehovah’s Witness commitment to pacifism and it is better
to lose one’s job than to betray God’s wishes. Even if Thomas
did not intend to inform or persuade others, it is possible for
some to infer and reflect upon the meaning of his resistance.
People may be inspired—or angered—by Thomas’s religious
expression, and they may come to realize, for example, that
they are insufficiently serious about their own religions, or that
they should not be zealous like Thomas. Either way, people
might find reflecting about Thomas’s religious expression to be
theoretically more rewarding and intense than the sort of
political speech and commercial speech that is underwritten by

310
This justification must logically depend on the assumption that Thomas’s
religious expression is a means of being faithful to his conscience, and that it does not
stem from a desire to avoid strenuous or dangerous activity or to avoid being under the
control of an overbearing supervisor.
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the justification from truth.311 Indeed, it seems inaccurate to
classify Thomas’s expression as merely religious, as if religious
speech were somehow concerned only with religious topics.
Thomas’s speech is also pregnant with political meaning: he
would prefer to lose his job than to do the government’s
military bidding. It is therefore not entirely clear why the
Court justified Thomas’s expression as simply an exercise in
religious conscience. Furthermore, similar to political speech,
Thomas’s expression is fully capable of helping the audience to
arrive at some conclusion about truth, namely, that statesponsored violence is unacceptable to those who take seriously
their religiously informed pacifism.
A similar kind of inference can be derived from West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, a case where the
Court recognized religious speech as protected by both the right
of religious expression and the right of free speech.312 As in
Thomas, the Court relied on the justification from conscience,
not truth, but the justification from truth would have been
perfectly serviceable. Like Thomas, Barnette involved
religionists who sought to be faithful to their consciences. The
West Virginia State Board of Education had passed a
resolution that required students and teachers to salute the
American flag as a regular part of classroom business.313 This
rule conflicted with the religious convictions of the Barnette
children who were Jehovah’s Witnesses.314
Justice
Jackson
for
the
Court
rejected
as
unconstitutional the compulsory flag salute, reasoning that it
unjustifiably coerced the Jehovah’s Witnesses into doing
something that contradicted their religious consciences. The
required salute, Jackson announced, “invades the sphere of
intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First
311
Imagine viewing a series of dull political sound bites for a series of
indistinguishable candidates or, worse, viewing a steady stream of commercials for five
different kinds of light beer.
312
Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633-34 (1943).
313
Id. at 626.
314
The beliefs of the Jehovah’s Witnesses

include a literal version of Exodus, Chapter 20, verses 4 and 5, which says:
“Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of
anything that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in
the water under the earth; thou shalt not bow down thyself to them nor serve
them.” They consider that the flag is an “image” within this command. For
this reason they refuse to salute it.
Id.
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Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official
control.”315 Jackson also proclaimed, “If there is any fixed star
in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or
petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”316 By
“invading the sphere of intellect and spirit” and by “forcing
citizens to confess” to practices that they find to be sinful, the
compulsory flag salute punishes a commitment to one’s
conscience in two respects: It compels the Jehovah’s Witnesses
to express a meaning which directly violates their religious
consciences and it prohibits them from expressing what they
believe their religious consciences tell them is right.
While the Jehovah’s Witness children may not have
sought to convey any meaning to their classmates or to the
school staff, their refusal was nonetheless clearly expressive: A
close reading of the Bible should preclude responsible
Jehovah’s Witnesses from paying homage to any graven image
of state-sponsored nationalism, and not even the threat of
school expulsion should deter them. Like the case of Eddie
Thomas, even if the Barnette children did not intend to inform
or persuade others, it is possible for some to infer and reflect
upon the meaning of their resistance. Their expression is
relevant to the audience’s process of deliberating about some
truth, namely, that one’s devotion to God must be complete and
is not compatible with an extant devotion to emblems of a
coerced nationalism. Thus the justification from truth could
have persuasively been applied in this case, just as it could
have been applied in many other cases involving nonproselytizing speech.
C.

Public Elementary, Middle, and High Schools

Applying the justification from truth to the religious
expression of the Barnette children, as I did previously, would
seem especially apt given that schools are places that the
Supreme Court has recognized as valuable, and perhaps
uniquely so, for the exchange of diverse ideas and viewpoints.
315

Id. at 642.
Id. Jackson also wrote: “To sustain the compulsory flag salute we are
required to say that a Bill of Rights which guards the individual’s right to speak his
own mind, left it open to public authorities to compel him to utter what is not in his
mind.” Id. at 634.
316
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In Ambach v. Norwick, the Supreme Court spoke of “the public
schools as inculcating fundamental values necessary to the
maintenance of a democratic political system . . . .”317 This may
involve recognizing public schools “as an ‘assimilative force’ by
which diverse and conflicting elements in our society are
brought together on a broad but common ground.”318 And in
Bethel School District v. Fraser, the Court similarly observed
that the public schools should aspire to teach the “fundamental
values of ‘habits and manners of civility’ essential to a
democratic society [which] must, of course, include tolerance of
divergent political and religious views, even when the views
expressed may be unpopular.”319
But if the justification from truth were to be employed
to defend a government law that requires public school
students to learn about religious diversity, how deeply should
the justification cut against a right to resist such exposure?
The answer to this question obviously depends on the facts.
Mozert v. Hawkins County Public Schools provides a usefully
heuristic example where the justification would survive
scrutiny.320 In 1983, the Hawkins County School Board in
Tennessee voted to require all students to take “character
education” courses.321 The purpose of the courses was “to help
each student develop positive values and to improve student
conduct as students learn to act in harmony with their positive
values and learn to become good citizens in their school,
community, and society.”322 The school board specifically
intended for the courses to use a textbook published by the
Holt Rinehart company in a manner that instilled critical
reading.323 Vicki Frost agreed that critical reading was
important but argued that her children’s First Amendment
rights of free exercise were being infringed upon by being
required to learn material that was “in violation of their

317
318

Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77 (1979).
Id. (citing JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION 26 (Macmillan

1929)).
319
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) (citing
CHARLES A. BEARD & MARY R. BEARD, A BASIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 228
(1944)).
320
Mozert v. Hawkins County Pub. Sch., 827 F.2d 1058, 1063-64 (6th Cir.
1987).
321
Id. at 1060.
322
TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-1007 (Supp. 1986).
323
Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1060.
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religious beliefs and convictions.”324 As a born-again Christian,
Frost condemned the Holt textbook mainly because it contained
“stories that develop ‘a religious tolerance that all religions are
merely different roads to God.’”325 She announced, “We cannot
be tolerant in that we accept other religious views on an equal
basis with ours.”326 Hence, Frost essentially rejected the
justification from truth as inapplicable in this instance. She
insisted that she and her children were already in possession of
the truth about religion and a diversity of competing religious
views would only confuse and subvert her children.
Chief Judge Lively for the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals did not agree and he provided persuasive reasons for
his conclusion. He reasoned that the Supreme Court’s reference
to the “tolerance of divergent . . . religious views” in Bethel
School District was a “civil tolerance, not a religious one.”327 As
such, the tolerance taught by the teachers in the Hawkins
County School District “does not require a person to accept any
other religion as the equal of the one to which that person
adheres.”328 All that it requires is “a recognition that in a
pluralistic society we must ‘live and let live.’”329 Lively added
that if “the Hawkins County schools had required the plaintiff
students either to believe or say they believe that ‘all religions
are merely different roads to God,’ this would be a different
case.”330 But there was no evidence to suggest that the school
compelled such affirmation.331 Rather, Chief Judge Lively
stated that the “only conduct compelled by the defendants was
reading and discussing the material in the Holt series, and
hearing other students’ interpretations of those materials,” and
it was this “exposure to which the plaintiffs objected.”332 In
other words, the Frost children were never coerced to accept
the “truth” on offer in the textbook. They were theoretically
free to criticize whatever ostensive truth was brought before
324

Id. at 1061.
Id. at 1068.
326
Id. at 1069.
327
Id.
328
Id.
329
Id.
330
Id.
331
The Court noted with regard to Frost’s concern “that she did not want her
children to make critical judgments and exercise choices in areas where the Bible
provides the answer. There is no evidence that any child in the Hawkins County
schools was required to make such judgments.” Id. at 1069.
332
Id.
325
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them. The justification from truth, then, is most appropriate
when it invites perusal over different options, not when it
compels affirmation of those options.
1. When the Majority Coerces the Minority
Lest my rendering of Mozert appear to evince a hidden
sympathy for the state, I want to clarify that the justification
from truth also prohibits the state from infringing on people’s
opportunities to retain the psychological resources necessary
for ascertaining some truth about religion. In contrast to
Mozert, Lee v. Weisman333 represents a case in which the
justification from truth would be insufficient to overcome a
student’s resistance to religious expression. Recall that the
principal of a public middle school had asked a rabbi to give a
nondenominational prayer during a graduation ceremony.334
Though the school had sought to convey a feeling of
“inclusiveness and sensitivity” through the prayer, Justice
Kennedy rejected the prayer as a violation of the
Establishment Clause. For in “this atmosphere the stateimposed character of an invocation and benediction by clergy
selected by the school combine to make the prayer a statesanctioned religious exercise in which the student was left with
no alternative but to submit.”335 As stated before, the
justification from truth is most appropriate in those settings
where the audience is being challenged to consider competing
or alternative viewpoints and where the audience feels
comfortable enough to deliberate about those viewpoints.336 In
Mozert, the audience, including the Frost children, had access
to a diversity of viewpoints about religion, especially those
viewpoints that would have been considered culturally outside
the norm for many children reared in a place like Hawkins
County, Tennessee,337 and the students were permitted and, at
least in theory, even invited to challenge those viewpoints.
The facts of Lee are different, however. First, unlike the
educational enterprise of Mozert, the school prayer in Lee was
333

505 U.S. 577 (1992).
See supra notes 270-274 and accompanying text.
335
Lee, 505 U.S. at 597.
336
See supra Part I.
337
Hawkins County had a population of 53,563 in 2000, of which 60% was
rural and only 3.3% comprised racial minorities. Hawkins County Industrial Board,
http://www.hawkinscounty.org/development/population.html (last visited Aug. 25,
2007).
334
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primarily, if not solely, a ceremonial event meant to enshrine a
set of religious truths. The prayer was comprised of an
“Invocation” and a “Benediction,” and the language in both
gives away the ceremonial nature of the prayer.338 Even the
part of the prayer that recognizes the importance of protecting
diversity, including presumably atheism and agnosticism, is
regarded as the product of God’s beneficence: “For the legacy of
America where diversity is celebrated and the rights of
minorities are protected, we thank You.”339 To be sure, the
nature of the religious expression in Thomas and Barnette is
similar to the prayer in Lee in that all three never consciously
sought to educate the public. However, unlike Lee, the
expressions in Thomas and Barnette were those of a religious
minority. Whereas the prayer in Lee had the support of the
school and the majority of the student body and the parents,
the expressions in Thomas and Barnette provoked
bewilderment and dismissal in the former and an angry
intolerance in the latter.340 Furthermore, the Jehovah’s
Witnesses in both cases provoked such responses precisely
because they refused to acquiesce to the wishes of the majority
and the state. Perhaps most importantly, whereas those who
belonged to the mainstream religions would not have felt
coerced to believe or disbelieve the meaning of the Jehovah’s
Witness expressions in Thomas and Barnette, those nonbelievers in Lee would have been much more likely to have felt
coerced into outwardly participating in the religious ceremony.
This conclusion tends to distinguish my formulation of
the justification from truth from that of Professor Marshall,
who is one of the few professors to have applied the
justification to the religion clauses. He argues:
[A] search for truth rationale would undercut the religious claims of
some groups that they have a constitutional right to be insulated
from societal forces that affect all other ideologies. Specifically, it
would suggest that . . . the fundamentalist claim in Mozert v.
Hawkins County Public Schools [is] seriously weakened if not
entirely misplaced. [For] the religious claim being advanced was that
there was a free exercise right not to be exposed to ideas that would
purportedly threaten the integrity of the religious community. The

338
339
340

See supra note 271 and accompanying text.
For the full text, see supra note 271.
See supra Part VI.B.
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validity of this argument would be very much in doubt if the Religion
Clauses were premised on a search for truth rationale.341

Under my approach, what makes Vicki Frost’s claim in Mozert
untenable is not that it rests on a desire to be immune from
“ideas that would purportedly threaten the integrity of the
religious community.” The claim is untenable for other reasons:
first, because it rejects participation in a setting where
religionists are required to consider a diversity of viewpoints
about religion; and, second, because the setting in which they
are so required lasts for the duration of a single class period in
a public school that is formally dedicated to broadening the
social outlook of its students. Neither of these two factors was
present in Lee. Instead, Lee did the opposite in consolidating
familiar religious perspectives that were prepared by a
mainstream religious coalition of Christians and Jews.342 And
the religious truths awaiting announcement in the school’s
Invocation and Benediction were not introduced in a setting of
tentative inquiry like in Mozert but were meant to be
consecrated through collective ritual.
For similar reasons, Bowers v. Hardwick343 and Harris v.
344
McRae also cannot be underwritten by the justification from
truth. Professor Marshall writes that
the search for truth rationale supports the Supreme Court’s
conclusion in cases such as Bowers v. Hardwick and Harris v. McRae
that there is no constitutional violation in prohibitions against
sodomy or abortion, respectively, solely because those prohibitions
reflect religious principles. If there are to be limitations on the role of
religion in the public sphere, those restrictions must be based on
something other than the substance of religious ideas.345

Quite true, but those restrictions would seem to inhere in the
justification from truth itself, or at least the deliberative
version that I defend. That is, the logic of the justification from
truth, as I have defined it, contains normative restrictions on
what forms of actions the state may express: actions that
promote deliberation are justified, while those that undermine
it are not. Bowers and Harris, like Lee, represent cases where
the state has not produced the effect of inviting its audience to

341
342
343
344
345

Marshall, supra note 12, at 267-68 (footnotes omitted).
Lee, 505 U.S. at 581.
478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
448 U.S. 297 (1980).
Marshall, supra note 12, at 266-67 (footnotes omitted).

2007]

DELIBERATING THE DIVINE

83

deliberate about a diversity of viewpoints or has no interest in
doing so. Rather, the state in both cases was instead
determined to transform its religious preferences into the force
of legal sanctions.
In Bowers, Georgia had passed an anti-sodomy statute
that its attorney general acknowledged would be applied only
to homosexuals.346 Concurring, Chief Justice Burger upheld the
law as speaking to our traditional Judeo-Christian abhorrence
of homosexuality.347 If the Georgia statute were indeed
prompted by such dread, it could not in my view find support
from the justification from truth. For, like the school-mandated
prayer in Lee, the anti-sodomy statute was not meant to
introduce a provocative minority perspective that would induce
public deliberation. The statute was meant to stifle such
deliberation by simply asserting the rightness of its own
religious preferences, and, worse, it wielded the threat of
criminal conviction and public humiliation against those who
refused to obey it.
A similar dynamic was at play in Harris. There,
Congress passed a law prohibiting the federal government from
funding abortions except to save the life of the mother or for
victims of rape or incest.348 If the law were passed to further a
Christian condemnation of abortion, the statute would not be
defensible under my version of the justification from truth.
Analogous to the state’s conduct in Lee and Bowers, the state in
Harris had little, if any, desire to provoke deliberation about
some minority perspective, nor can we seriously assume that
such deliberation was the statute’s probable effect. The state’s
aims are better described as principally administrative in
placing potentially debilitating obstacles before those who seek
abortions. Thus, the justification from truth should not be
applied in all cases in which speech is religious, especially
when the majority is imposing its views on the minority.
2. A Limited Diversity: Why Creation Science Can
Be Excluded
I have argued for a diversity of religious viewpoints, but
a boundless diversity cannot be managed in practice because
346
347
348

926 (1979)).

Bowers, 478 U.S. at 201.
Id. at 196-97 (Burger, J., concurring).
Harris, 448 U.S. 297, 302 (1980) (citing Pub. L. No. 96-123, § 109, 93 Stat.
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there are not enough resources to accommodate them all. There
are some viewpoints that must be excluded or given low
priority even if they represent minority perspectives. On a
certain level of abstraction, the process of ranking viewpoints
is, I suppose, normatively inconsistent with the project of
encouraging a diversity of viewpoints that I have espoused thus
far. Yet such tension need not condemn us to utter confusion,
either. The Supreme Court illustrates how one can embrace a
diversity of viewpoints without affording legal protection for
every single viewpoint. Even under the justification from truth
as applied to secular speech, the Court has denied
constitutional protection, for example, to fighting words,349
libel,350 and obscenity.351 In each of these settings, the Court has
stated that the speech, while bursting with meaning, possesses
the sort of meaning that is incompatible with the
administrative and normative priorities of civil society.352
Like the Court, I can provide reasons for excluding some
viewpoints and, thus, preferring one conception of diversity
over another. I can illustrate this practice by trying to justify
the exclusion of creation science and intelligent design as
meaningful scientific theories from public high schools, middle
schools, and elementary schools. Whereas evolutionists believe
that humans evolved from natural causes, advocates for
creation science and intelligent design argue that some
intelligent Being that was anterior to the existence of anything
is responsible for the creation and evolution of humans.353
349

Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 568 (1942).
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (“[T]here is no
constitutional value in false statements of fact.”).
351
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 15 (1973).
352
Justice Murphy alluded to a consonant theme in Chaplinsky:
350

There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the
prevention and punishment of which has never been thought to raise any
Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the
libelous, and the insulting or “fighting” words-those which by their very
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.
315 U.S. at 571-72 (footnotes omitted).
353
Duane T. Gish, an advocate for creation science, juxtaposes his position
with that of evolutionists: “Creation theory postulates . . . that all basic animal and
plant types (the created kinds) were brought into being by the acts of a preexisting
Being by means of special processes that are not operative today.” Duane T. Gish,
Creation, Evolution, and the Historical Evidence, in BUT IS IT SCIENCE?, supra note
108, at 266, 266. William Dembski, a believer in intelligent design, also subscribes to a
similar view: “From observable features of the natural world, intelligent design infers
to an intelligence responsible for those features. The world contains events, objects and
structures that exhaust the explanatory resources of undirected natural causes and
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Creation scientists tend to differ from believers in intelligent
design in that the former sometimes assert that science can
support a literal interpretation of the Bible,354 whereas the
latter claim more guardedly that science points to an
intelligent Being, whose aims or values are unknowable, as the
cause of the universe.355 I dwell on their similarities, though,
because there is a fatal flaw in their common premise that
science points to a Higher Being as the creator of our known
universe and everything in it.
To return to the Article’s theme, I want to argue in this
section that creation science can be rejected on the grounds of
that can be adequately explained only by recourse to intelligent causes.” WILLIAM A.
DEMBSKI, INTELLIGENT DESIGN: THE BRIDGE BETWEEN SCIENCE AND THEOLOGY 107
(1999).
354
Henry M. Morris, the Director of the Institute for Creation Research, is a
good example. He states: “The Bible is the Word of God, absolutely inerrant and
verbally inspired . . . The Bible gives us the revelation we need, and it will be found
that all the known facts of science or history can be very satisfactorily understood
within this Biblical framework.” HENRY M. MORRIS, EVOLUTION AND THE MODERN
CHRISTIAN 55 (1967), quoted in Joel Cracraft, The Scientific Response to Creationism,
in CREATIONISM, SCIENCE, AND THE LAW: THE ARKANSAS CASE 138, 139 (Marcel
Chotkowski La Follette ed., 1983). Elsewhere, Morris writes that creation science
supports the Bible’s account of Genesis and Noah’s Flood. SCIENTIFIC CREATIONISM
205-08, 213 (Henry M. Morris ed., 1974).
355
William Dembski, a proponent of intelligent design, writes:
In the past design was a plausible but underdeveloped philosophical
intuition. Now it is a robust program of scientific research. Consequently
intelligent design is under no obligation to speculate about the nature, moral
character or purposes of any designing intelligence it happens to infer. (Here
rather is a task for the theologian—to connect the intelligence inferred by the
design theorist with the God of Scripture.) Indeed this is one of the great
strengths of intelligent design, that it distinguishes design from purpose. We
can know that something is designed without knowing the ultimate or even
proximate purpose for which it was designed.
DEMBSKI, supra note 353, at 107-08. Still, in other places, Dembski clearly evinces his
prioritization of Christianity, and thus implies that his “scientific” endeavors are
meant less to find the truth, whatever it may be, than to vindicate his religious faith:
If we take seriously the word-flesh Christology of Chalcedon (i.e., the doctrine
that Christ is fully human and fully divine) and view Christ as the telos
toward which God is drawing the whole of creation, then any view of the
sciences that leaves Christ out of the picture must be seen as fundamentally
deficient.
Id. at 206 (footnotes omitted). And the self-styled creation scientist Henry Morris
sometimes poses like a more dispassionate advocate of intelligent design when he
writes that the purpose of “scientific creationism” “is, first, to treat all of the more
pertinent aspects of the subject of origins and to do this solely on a scientific basis, with
no references to the Bible or to religious doctrine.” SCIENTIFIC CREATIONISM, supra note
354, at 3. This is the sort of promiscuous affinity between intelligent design and
creation science that leads me to believe that, notwithstanding the differences in their
names, their advocates are often people who share more or less the same aspirations
and beliefs about their work.
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employing a diversity of viewpoints to discover the truth. For it
is my contention that creation science fails to contribute to a
meaningful diversity of views in public schools insofar as it is
presented as a legitimate or potentially legitimate statement
about “science.” As I will show, creation science, like libel, has
the tendency to mislead the audience with false statements
because it styles itself a science but contains none of the
standard indicia of science. In this way, just as we may exclude
libel from constitutional protection even though it may
contribute to a diversity of viewpoints, so we may also exclude
creation science from being taught in public elementary,
middle, and high schools.
I can begin to explain my argument by turning to
McLean v. Arkansas Board of Education.356 In 1981, Arkansas
passed the “Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and
Evolution-Science Act.”357 As its name suggests, the Act
appeared to make a formal bid for a diversity of viewpoints—a
“balanced treatment” of opposing perspectives—an assumption
reinforced by its professed aims. In solemnly progressive tones,
the statute is studded with the tropes of innocent intellectual
curiosity. It makes reference to respect for different values,
aspirations to epistemic neutrality, and even a desire for the
“search for truth”:
This Legislature enacts this Act for public schools [with] the purpose
of protecting academic freedom for students’ differing values and
beliefs; ensuring neutrality toward students’ diverse religious
convictions; ensuring freedom of religious exercise for students and
their parents; guaranteeing freedom of belief and speech for
students; preventing establishment of Theologically Liberal,
Humanist, Nontheist, or Atheist religions; preventing discrimination
against students on the basis of their personal beliefs concerning
creation and evolution; and assisting students in their search for
truth. This Legislature does not have the purpose of causing
instruction in religious concepts or making an establishment of
religion.358

Section 1 of the Act continues this endorsement of
diversity and balance of viewpoints, requiring that public
schools give “balanced treatment” to both theories of
evolution.359 Such language would imply that the Arkansas
356

529 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982).
Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science Act, ARK.
CODE ANN. § 80-1663 (Supp. 1981).
358
Id.
359
The law reads:
357
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legislature was merely interested in doing what I have sought
to do throughout the Article: urge the merits of deliberation
about a diversity of viewpoints. But upon closer inspection this
conclusion is not quite right. For the statute misleadingly
ascribes the characteristics of that which is properly called
science to “creation science.” So declares section 7(j):
Creation-science is an alternative scientific model of origins and can
be presented from a strictly scientific standpoint without any
religious doctrine just as evolution-science can, because there are
scientists who conclude that scientific data best support creationscience and because scientific evidences and inferences have been
presented for creation-science.360

Section 4(a) outlined the scientific qualities of creation
science:
“Creation-science” means the scientific evidences for creation and
inferences from those scientific evidences. Creation-science includes
the scientific evidences and related inferences that indicate: (1)
Sudden creation of the universe, energy, and life from nothing . . . .361

To assess the scientific merits of this claim, Judge Overton for
the district court first provided a definition of science by which
they could be compared. After deliberating the expert
testimony, he summarized “the essential characteristics of
science”:
(1) It is guided by natural law; (2) It has to be explanatory by
reference to natural law; (3) It is testable against the empirical
world; (4) Its conclusions are tentative, i.e., are not necessarily the
final word; and (5) It is falsifiable.362

The claims by creation science in McLean could not comport
with these requirements. Most damagingly, creation science
could not be justified as based on “natural law.” For the
Arkansas statute insists in section 4(a)(1) that the “[s]udden
Public schools within this State shall give balanced treatment to creationscience and to evolution-science. Balanced treatment to these two models
shall be given in classroom lectures taken as a whole for each course, in
textbook materials taken as a whole for each course, in library materials
taken as a whole for the sciences and taken as a whole for the humanities,
and in other educational programs in public schools, to the extent that such
lectures, textbooks, library materials, or educational programs deal in any
way with the subject of the origin of man, life, the earth, or the universe.
Id.
360
361
362

Id.
Id.
McLean v. Ark. Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1267 (E.D. Ark. 1982).
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creation of the universe, energy, and life” derives from
“nothing,” and thus insists too that a force that is anterior to
nature itself has created human beings and the universe which
they know. What the logic of creation science relies on, then, is
an appeal to divine intervention, the only force that can create
the universe out of “nothing.”363 As such, there is no way to test
the conclusion that God created the universe since there is
literally “nothing” to test as a proposition about physical
matter.364 Therefore, creation science, unlike conventional
science, is not falsifiable.365 For the same reason, it is not
363
Judge Overton explained that creation science “is not science because it
depends upon a supernatural intervention which is not guided by natural law. It is not
explanatory by reference to natural law, is not testable and is not falsifiable.” Id.
364
As Judge Overton stated: “If the unifying idea of supernatural creation by
God is removed from Section 4, the remaining parts of the section explain nothing and
are meaningless assertions.” Id.
365
The zoologist Stephen Jay Gould, a trial witness against Arkansas in
MacLean, delivered an especially keen critique of creation science:

“Scientific creationism” is a self-contradictory, nonsense phrase precisely
because it cannot be falsified. I can envision observations and experiments
that would disprove any evolutionary theory I know, but I cannot imagine
what potential data could lead creationists to abandon their beliefs.
Unbeatable systems are dogma, not science. Lest I seem harsh or rhetorical, I
quote creationism’s leading intellectual. Duane Gish, Ph.D., from his recent
(1978) book, Evolution? The Fossils Say No! “By creation we mean the
bringing into being by a supernatural Creator of the basic kinds of plants and
animals by the process of sudden, or fiat, creation. We do not know how the
Creator created, what processes He used, for He used processes which are not
now operating anywhere in the natural universe [Gish’s italics]. This is why
we refer to creation as special creation. We cannot discover by scientific
investigations anything about the creative processes used by the Creator.”
Pray tell, Dr. Gish, in the light of your last sentence, what then is “scientific”
creationism?
STEPHEN JAY GOULD, HEN’S TEETH AND HORSE’S TOES, 253-62 (1983) (quotation on
256-57); Joel Cracraft, a science adviser to the American Civil Liberties Union who
challenged the Arkansas statute describes the operations of the statute as follows:
No longer can science construct explanatory hypotheses about events having
a time dimension—to creationists, science must study only the observable,
only that which can be verified in a laboratory experiment. No longer must
scientific ideas, or conjectures, be subject to criticism and eventual rejection—
some statements, such as those derived from revelation, are not only to be
considered scientific in their content, but also impervious to criticism.
Joel Cracraft, The Scientific Response to Creationism, in CREATIONISM, SCIENCE, AND
THE LAW: THE ARKANSAS CASE 138, 139 (Marcel C. La Follette ed., 1983). The
philosopher of science Michael Ruse was an expert witness against Arkansas. During
cross examination, Ruse responded:
First, and most importantly, creation science necessarily looks to the
supernatural acts of a Creator. According to creation-science theory, the
Creator has intervened in supernatural ways using supernatural forces.
Moreover, because the supernatural forces are the acts of a Creator, that is,
the acts of God, they are not subject to scientific investigation or
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tentative in its conclusions, as is science, but instead provides
that God is the final word.366 Creation science can thus be
rejected as something that students should learn in public
schools in order to enrich their knowledge of science. This is not
to suggest that there is no cultural or religious value to
creationism or that those who believe it are necessarily wrong.
Rather, it is to suggest that an inherently religious account of
the origins of the universe should be regarded as founded on its
unique epistemic resources of faith, not empirical science. Or,
to state the objection in terms of my discussion of scientific
paradigms,367 creation science attempts to conscript the
paradigm of science to make sense of claims that are inherently
resistant to the logic of science.368
understanding. This nonscientific aspect of creation science emerges quite
clearly from the creation-science literature I have read.
Michael Ruse, Witness Testimony Sheet, McLean v. Arkansas, in BUT IS IT SCIENCE?,
supra note 108, at 287, 304. Ruse has made similar arguments elsewhere. See RUSE,
DARWINISM DEFENDED, supra note 108, at 322 (arguing that the reliance on miracles
by creation scientists “lie[s] outside of science, which by definition deals only with the
natural, the repeatable, that which is governed by law”). For an argument about how
Darwinism provides a heuristic of falsifiability, see Sir Karl Popper, Darwinism as a
Metaphysical Research Program, in BUT IS IT SCIENCE?, supra note 108, at 144, 145-47.
366
See supra notes 363-365 and accompanying text.
367
See supra notes 113-118 and accompanying text.
368
The theology professor Langdon Gilkey at the University of Chicago, a
witness against Arkansas, explains:
The creation-science “model” is . . . not an example of science at all; it
involves a supra-natural cause, transcendent to the system of finite causes; it
explains in terms of purposes and intentions; and it cites a transcendent,
unique, and unrepeatable—even in principle, uncontrollable—action. It
represents, therefore, logically and linguistically, a re-edition of a familiar
form—that is, “natural theology,” which argues that certain data point
“rationally” to a philosophical/religious conclusion, namely, to the agency of a
divine being.
Second, the creationists fail to distinguish the question of ultimate origins
(Where did it all come from?) from the quite different question of proximate
origins (How did A arise out of B, if it did?). They ignore the (scholastic)
distinction between the primary causality of a First Cause, with which
philosophy or theology might deal, and secondary causality, which is
causality confined to finite factors. Assuming that it is science’s role to deal
with the truth and, therefore, with all of the truth, they conclude that a
scientific explanation of origins must be an exhaustive explanation and must
be inclusive of all possible related factors or causes. If evolution theory deals
with proximate origins, it must also deal with the question of ultimate
origins. If, in this process, evolution theory has left out God, then it must be
asserting that there is no God, or that the divine is in no way the Creator of
the process of secondary causes. At the Arkansas trial, the creationists
therefore interpreted the scientific witnesses’ demurrals that “science does
not raise the question about God at all” as meaning that science rules out the
presence of God in any way.
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The justification from truth, then, need not and, indeed,
cannot accept every expression as equally likely to help the
audience arrive at some truth.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The justification from truth can boast a distinguished
pedigree and its theoretical potential is, in my view, powerful.
It is also, as I have shown, the dominant basis of support in the
Supreme Court for the right of free speech. Curiously, the
justification has gone relatively ignored in the realm of
religious expression. I have tried in this Article to apply the
justification to religious expression, and I have suggested that
by doing so we can arrive at better conclusions about the truth.

Langdon Gilkey, The Creationist Controversy: The Interpretation of Inquiry and Belief,
SCI., TECHNOLOGY, & HUMAN VALUES, Summer 1982, at 67, 68.

